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ABSTRACT
ANOMALY BASED INTRUSION DETECTION FOR NETWORK
MONITORING USING A DYNAMIC HONEYPOT
Jeff Hieb
November 10, 2004
This thesis proposes a network based intrusion detection approach using anomaly
detection and achieving low configuration and maintenance costs. A honeypots is an
emerging security tool that has several beneficial characteristics, one of which is that all
traffic to it is anomalous. A dynamic honeypot reduces the configuration and
maintenance costs of honeypot deployment. An anomaly based intrusion detection
system with low configuration and maintenance costs can be constructed by simply
observing the egress and ingress to a dynamic honeypot.
This thesis explores the design and implementation of a dynamic honeypot using
a variety of publicly available tools. The main contributions of the design consist of a
database containing network relevant information and a dynamic honeypot engine that
generates honeypot configurations from the relevant network information. The thesis
also explores a simple intrusion detection system built around the dynamic honeypot.
These systems were experimentally implemented and preliminary testing identified
anomalous traffic, though in some cases it was not necessarily intrusive. In one instance
the dynamic honeypot based intrusion detection system identified an intrusion, which was
not detected by conventional means.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
1.1

Background
Given the growing dependence of the American economy on information

technology and the proliferation of networks, computers, and connectivity; securing
computer systems is more difficult and more important. Fortunately, industry, the
government, and individuals have begun to practice better computer security. In the 2004
Computer Crime and Security Survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute and
the FBI [62], the reported total loss in dollars was less than that reported in 2003.
Unfortunately, the amount was still over $140,000,000, with over $55,000,000 alone
attributed to viruses.

Figure 1.1. Computer Security related losses for 2004 [62].
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Another area of concern is critical infrastructure and SCADA systems, and it is
difficult to associate a dollar figure with compromises to these systems. Critical
infrastructures and SCADA systems are ubiquitous; they involve everything from water
and power to financial and logistic systems. In a recent article in Information Security
titled “Mission: Critical”, Stephen Barlas and other discuss cyber security and critical
infrastructure [61]. A successful attack on one of these systems could be catastrophic.
Imagine the consequences of a large scale and persistent outage of telecommunications
networks, such an event could create panic and disorder, cripple the government’s
response capabilities, as well as do serious financial damage to a wide variety of
companies. Similar scenarios are true for other critical infrastructures.
“According to SBC communications, the number of telecom vulnerabilities
doubles each year,” and in the financial sector “more than half of IT and security
professionals . . . say they’re unprepared for a cyber attack” [61]. While most agree that
we are better prepared today than a few years ago, cyber security for critical
infrastructures is an ongoing and never ending task that requires the continued
development of newer and better security technologies.
The objective of computer security is to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and
availability of data or resources and good security is best achieved through the combined
use of various security technologies. Examples of such technologies include firewalls,
encryption, access control lists, and intrusion detection systems. As part of the CSI/FBI
survey, information about the types of security technologies used was collected and is
shown in figure 1.2. Firewalls and anti-virus software are the predominant security
technologies in use today, being the only two security technologies used by almost every
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respondent to the survey, however the use of intrusion detection is increasing. And as
companies are required to be more accountable with respect to the security of sensitive
data in their position, good intrusion detection will soon become a necessity.

Figure 1.2. Percentage of companies using various security
technologies [62].
Early work by Denning on intrusion detection systems identified two separate but
equally valid approaches in detecting intrusions: anomaly detection and misuse detection.
Misuse detection identifies an intrusion using a set of “rules” developed by analyzing
known attacks. Anomaly detection identifies an intrusion based on a deviation from
normal activity. Today’s systems continue to use either anomaly detection or misuse
detection, or some combination of both.
There are a variety of both commercial and public domain intrusion detection
systems, Snort being one of the most well known in the public domain. Snort is also the
basis for the commercial intrusion detection system Sourcefire. Snort, as do many other
intrusion detection systems, uses misuse detection. It depends on a set of rules that
define different types of known intrusion signatures. When the conditions of a rule are
met, Snort generates an alert indicating that it has detected an intrusion.
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Maintaining and updating these rules and responding to alerts are ongoing and
time-consuming tasks, and if the rules become out of date, then the intrusion detection
system becomes increasingly less effective. In addition to maintaining the rules,
someone must respond to the alerts. Sometimes signatures may also match valid activity,
meaning that responding to alerts first requires determining whether the alert is the result
of an intrusion or unexpected, but valid, system activity. All of these require highly
trained personnel to carry out.
Another problem faced by current intrusion detection technologies is bandwidth.
As bandwidth continues to increase it becomes more and more difficult to capture and
analyze the volume of information in an acceptable period of time (micro-seconds).
When the bandwidth limits of an intrusion detection system are exceeded, it can fail to
detect an intrusion. Current intrusion detection systems like Snort are effective; however,
it is commonly held that anomaly detection will ultimately prove more valuable and
robust because it has the potential to identify previously unknown intrusions or attacks.
Honeypots are a new security technology that, while not a replacement for
traditional intrusion detection systems, address some of the weaknesses of intrusion
detection systems. Because their only purpose is to be attacked, all traffic to the
honeypot can be considered an intrusion or an anomaly of some sort. For this reason
there is no need to separate normal traffic from anomalous; this makes any data collected
from a honeypot of high value. Neither are they vulnerable to the bandwidth issue that
more traditional IDSs face.
Honeypots do face several important challenges: 1) honeypots are totally unaware
of attacks not directed at them, 2) they must avoid being fingerprinted because if an
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attacker can easily identify honeypots their usefulness will be severely limited, and 3)
like so many security technologies, they require configuring and maintaining by a
knowledgeable person.
Lance Spitzner has recently put forth a new honeypot concept called a dynamic
honeypot. A dynamic honeypot is a plug and play solution that configures itself to suit
the network environment in which it finds itself. This makes the honeypot much simpler
to use and maintain and improves the likelihood that a network intrusion will include a
visit to one of the honeypots. Dynamic honeypots might also be more difficult to
fingerprint, because they are properly configured and “unique.”
Honeypots, because of their very nature, excel at detection. What makes them
most attractive in the area of detection is the fact that they implement anomaly detection,
and appear to do so very effectively. An intrusion detection system that uses a dynamic
honeypot could potentially provide anomaly based intrusion detection. Such a system
could be deployed on a production network and require very little maintenance and
configuration. Both anomaly detection and low configuration and maintenance overhead
are desirable characteristics for intrusion detection.
Dynamic honeypots have yet to receive a lot of research attention, having only
been proposed in September 2003. This thesis will describe the design and
implementation of an experimental dynamic honeypot and a simple intrusion detection
system based upon this honeypot. The dynamic honeypot was able to achieve
autonomous configuration and deployment of honeypots in a variety of simulated
network environments. The intrusion detection system reported various anomalies and in
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during one test detected an exploit attempt that was not detected by a conventional
intrusion detection system.
1.2

Organization Of Thesis.
Chapter two presents a detailed literature review of intrusion detection concepts,

principles and approaches. Chapter three discusses the design of the dynamic honeypot
and an intrusion detection system based upon the honeypot. Chapter four describes the
implementation of the dynamic honeypot and the intrusion detection system. In Chapter
five, testing of the dynamic honeypot and the intrusion detection system are described in
detail. Chapter six presents some conclusions and possible directions for future research.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
This chapter gives an overview of relevant previous work by other researchers. It
includes sections on intrusion detection systems and honeypots.
2.1

Intrusion Detection Systems.
Since the development of time-sharing systems in the 1960’s the need for

computer security has been recognized and studied [10, 30,36,31,32] and has lead to the
development of a variety of security systems and approaches. Initial systems developed
during the 1960’s and 1970’s focused on prevention by attempting to deny access to
unauthorized resources [10,36]. For example: a user identification and password that
would prevent unauthorized individuals from logging onto the system. For systems with
many users, an access control matrix would prevent valid users from accessing files (or
system resources) to which they had not been granted authorization. Beyond these types
of measures, security officers were charged with assessing the security of the system,
based in part on lengthy logs.
In 1980 Anderson [36] showed that a variety of threats could be addressed by
analyzing audit trails. He began by identifying the following types of intruders or
penetrators: external penetrators, internal penetrators, and misfeasors. External
penetrators were those not authorized to use the computer at all. Internal penetrators
were those who were authorized to use the computer but not authorized to use the
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specific data or resource being accessed. This included two sub-categories,
masqueraders, individuals who used someone else’s user id and password, and
clandestine users, individuals who evaded auditing and access control measures.
Misfeasors were individuals who were authorized to use the computer and the specific
resource, but who misused their privilege.
One example given by Anderson was detecting an external penetrator based on
failed login attempts. Anderson went on to outline numerous security related audit trails
and their relation to various threats. He also realized that large amounts of audit data,
while potentially very useful for assessing and monitoring the security of a system, would
overwhelm a security officer. At the same time storage was becoming cheaper, allowing
audit logs to be moved online [45]. So Anderson began to explore automating audit trail
analysis, and described a surveillance system that would collect and processes audit files
and produce a daily report [28,36].
In 1987 Denning presented an abstract model of an Intrusion Detection Expert
System called IDES [24]. IDES was a model of a real-time intrusion-detection expert
system, meaning that it would process audit data as it was generated, and immediately
inform the security officer of an intrusion. It was independent of any particular system,
application, or vulnerability, and served as a general framework for an intrusion detection
expert system. Denning intended IDES to be implemented on a separate, high
performance, system allowing IDES the ability to process audit records in real time
without interfering with the performance of the target system.
Denning’s IDES model was based on the idea that exploiting (or attacking) a
system involves abnormal use of the system and therefore an intrusion could be detected
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from abnormal patterns of system use. To do this the IDES generated and updated
profiles that represent normal system use. Audit records were then matched against the
profiles using rule-based pattern matching. An anomaly was generated when the audit
data fail to conform to the profile. This gave IDES the ability to detect a wide variety of
threats, attacks, or intrusions, independent from any knowledge about the specific
vulnerabilities the target system might have.
In 1989 Teresa Lunt [28] elaborated on the IDES model and begin development
of an actual system. Lunt pointed out that Anderson’s approach of detecting an external
penetrator by auditing failed login attempts could be though of as looking for specific
characteristic’s of an intrusion in audit records, where as Denning’s IDES approach
looked for audit records that did not fit normal system/user behavior. The IDES
architecture designed by Lunt included both of these approached in a loosely coupled
system, as seen in figure 2.1. The statistical intrusion detection monitors subjects via
audit records, identifying audit records that fail to fit with in the normal profile for that
subject. The rule-based intrusion detection system examines audit data for known
intrusion scenarios such as failed login attempts. These two approaches continue to
define intrusion detection system approaches today and are typically known as misuse
detection and anomaly detection [46,45].
Misuse detection is usually implemented with a rule-based system developed from
knowledge about the characteristics of previous intrusions. These characteristics or
descriptions are often referred to as signatures. Specific signatures are then matched
against the data, in essence looking for evidence of an intrusion or attack, as in
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Anderson’s example of failed login attempts. Another example of this approach,
presented by Ilgun [44], uses state transition signatures.
Anomaly detection searches for unusual events, often using statistical metrics to
define “unusual.” Anomaly detection begins with one or more “models” of user or
system behavior that are built up over time. These models describe the normal behavior
of the system or user. Deviations from the normal indicate anomalies that are then
assumed to be an intrusion or attack. Different modeling approaches have included
statistical methods [28,14], rule based systems [26], neural networks [27] and other softcomputing techniques [13].
An important set of concepts related to intrusion detection is false positive and
false negative. False positives are events that the system detects as an intrusion but are in
fact acceptable system events. False negatives are intrusions that the system fails to
recognize. It is important that both of these are kept to a minimum; too many false
positives leads to alarms being ignored, too many false negatives and the IDS isn’t doing
anybody any good.
Both misuse detection and anomaly detection have their advantages and
disadvantages. One of the biggest advantages of anomaly detection is its potential to
detect novel or previously unknown attacks. Another appealing advantage is that once it
is installed and set up anomaly detection requires little additional administrative
maintenance. However, anomaly detection tends to have a very high false positive rate,
often requires extensive training, and can be computationally expensive [45,46]. Misuse
detection, one the other hand, is very efficient at detecting attacks without generating lots
of false positives, and can be more easily used by system managers with less security
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expertise. Unfortunately misuse detection cannot detect unknown attacks, meaning it has
a potentially high false negative rate. Additionally, because new attacks are constantly
being release, the signature database must constantly be updated, requiring ongoing
administrative maintenance. Failure to keep signature databases up to date severely
limits the capabilities of misuse detection [45,46].
Target System

Rule-Based
Intrusion
Detection

Statistical
Intrusion
Detection

User Interface

Figure 2.1. The IDES Model [28]
Early systems were all host-based systems (HIDS), meaning that they operated on
only one computer, usually referred to as the target. This reflects the fact that most
computers at that time were large mainframes with terminal connections. As PCs
reached their glory in the late 80’s and 90’s, the paradigm of the single large mainframe
gave way to networks with a variety of desktops and servers comprising LANs and
WANs. The proliferation of the Internet and networking technology reinforced this
trend.
In response to this changing environment, came the idea of a NIDS [10,45], or
network intrusion detection system. Instead of examining events on a specific host, these
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systems would try to identify intrusions by monitoring network traffic. Basically NIDS
use the same approach as HIDS, misuse and anomaly detection, but the source of
information on which they operate, called a sensor, is different. Essentially NIDS
examine the communications between computers on a network, as opposed to system
level audit trails. As would be expected false positives and false negatives continued to
be a primary concern [45].
The main advantage of NIDS is that a few well-placed sensors are capable of
monitoring a large network. In addition, their deployment usually has little effect on the
rest of the network, as far as performance is concerned. However, they do not have
access to system level audit logs as do HIDS; and more importantly, for busy networks
they may fail to process all packets. Another problem they face is the fact that they
cannot analyze encrypted packets. While HIDS do not have these weaknesses, in large
networks, with many hosts, a HIDS on every host can be extremely hard to manage [46].
Combining NIDS and HIDS was investigated through the development of
distributed systems and hybrid systems [10,20,30]. Such approaches centralize the
analysis component, with host-based sensors and network based sensors feeding into a
single analysis engine. While maximizing the advantages of HIDS and NIDS, it creates a
single point of failure, which itself might become the target of an attack. Attempts to
address this weakness have included investigations into mobile security agents [25] and
artificial immune system models [12]. These approaches de-centralize control and
operation of distributed intrusion detection systems, but their reliance on some type of
anomaly detection approach means they are still plagued by high false positive rate.
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Largely for performance reasons commercial IDS today are primarily based on
misuse detection techniques [45,46]. Snort [55], one of the most popular IDS used today,
is an excellent example. Snort is a network intrusion detection system that matches
packets collected from the network against a set of rules or signatures. These signatures
are developed from known attacks, and must constantly be updated. One way to improve
the effectiveness of IDS like Snort is to include some type of anomaly detection [45].
2.2

Honeypots
Recently, honeypots have been receiving attention from security professionals

looking for new tools to help them in the fight against the exponentially growing number
of threats. The basic idea of a honeypot is to observe a system that you allow to be
attacked, figure 2.2. Lance Spitzner defines a honeypot as follows: “A honeypot is a
security resource whose value lies in being probed, attacked, or compromised” [1]. Since
honeypots have no production value, no resource or person should be communicating
with them, and therefore any activity arriving at a honeypot is likely to be a probe, scan,
or attack. Their value comes from their potential ability to capture scans, probes, attacks,
and other malicious activity.
There are three types of honeypots: low interaction, medium interaction, and high
interaction [1]. In order to collect information a honeypot must interact with the attacker,
and the level of interaction refers to the degree of interaction the honeypot has with a
potential attacker. A low interaction honeypot provides minimal service, like an open
port. A medium interaction honeypot simulates basic interactions like asking for a login
and password, but providing no actual service to log into. High interaction honeypots
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offer a fully functioning service or operating system, which can potentially be
compromised.
There are two important categories of honeypots, production honeypots and
research honeypots [1]. Production honeypots are honeypots that are used to protect an
organization or an organization’s operational network. Research honeypots, on the other
hand, are used for research and intelligence gathering, and are not part of any commercial
security mechanism. Production honeypots tend to be low-interaction and research
honeypots tend to be high-interaction. Finally honeynets [53] are elaborate networks of
multiple high-interaction honeypots and sophisticated monitoring software, and they are
used almost exclusively for research.
The first documentation relating to honeypots occurred in the early 1990’s in the
works of Clifford Stoll, and Bill Cheswick. [33,34]. Neither describe their systems or
techniques as “honeypots” but the central ideas of honeypots can be clearly seen in their
work. These publications, while not technical, contributed significantly to a growing
interest in honeypots and the development of numerous solutions. The first available
honeypot solution, Deception Toolkit or DK, was released in 1997 [1]. DK is a
collection of PERL scripts and C code that emulate various Unix vulnerabilities and then
log the behavior and actions of an attack or attacker. CyberCop Sting, in 1998, was the
first commercial honeypot, and introduced for the first time, virtual systems bound to a
single host.
The idea of virtual honeypots made honeypot technology more affordable and
available to a wider audience and encouraged development of better implementations.
One of these is Honeyd, a robust open source honeypot solution developed by Niels
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Provos [6,56]. Honeyd has the ability to emulate different operating systems at the IP
layer and run scripts attached to specific ports using stdin and stdout. Instead of being
limited to one IP address, Honeyd has the ability to bind to multiple IP address, making it
able to create virtual honeypots that emulate multiple systems with different operating
systems and applications and map them to unused IP addresses. It is a very powerful
honeypot solution [50] version 0.8 was released in 2003, and included significant
improvements.

Figure 2.2. Honeypot deployment on a DMZ [1]
Initially, honeynets were just a network containing one or more honeypots [53],
the next generation of honeynets, known as Gen II honeypots by the Honeynet project,
were adapted from captured rootkits [52]. These honeypots are kernel modules, and
provide superior clandestine monitoring capabilities for high-interaction honeypots.
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Sebek is the most well known Gen II honeypot, and is a Linux kernel module. Sebek
hooks all sys_read calls and covertly transports them to a remote monitor. This allows
the host based monitoring of a compromised system without the attackers awareness.
With the success of early honeypots like Bof and Specter, more investigation into
their potential uses in security has been done. Their potential use in prevention lies in
distracting hackers or wasting their valuable time and resources attacking honeypots
instead of production systems. The Labrea Tar pit honeypot is designed to prevent
attacks by maintaining an, artificially slow, open connection to non-existent services [1].
Honeypots have also been explored as a means of detecting and preventing a DDoS
attack and capturing forensic data [26,41].
Honeypots have even greater potential when it comes to detection. Levine et al
[16] deployed a honeynet at Georgia tech that they used to detect exploited systems
across their enterprise network. They successfully identified a system within the network
that they suspected had been infected by a worm. In addition to identifying the infected
system, they were able to provide the IT department with enough data to develop a
signature for the previously unknown exploit [16]. They also identified an account
whose password had been compromised by analyzing traffic to a backdoor installed on
one of the honeypots from a system in the production part of the network.
Honeypots have also been shown to be effective against Internet worms. Laurent
Oudot [7] demonstrated how MSBlast could be detected and captured using Honeyd and
some simple scripts. He also showed how worm propagation can be slowed using
Honeyd to attract the worms attention and then respond very slowly to its requests.
Using scripts, Oudot demonstrated how a honeypot could even launch a counter attack
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against a worm outbreak, either by isolating services or network segments, or by abusing
the same vulnerability the worm used and then trying to kill the worm process.
Detection and identification of new threats is one of the most important areas in
security. In July of 2002 the Honeynet project caught a previously unknown dtscpd
exploit “in the wild” in one of their honeypots [1]. Identifying the new exploit and
understanding it were carried out by researchers, but the fact that a honeypot was able to
capture a new exploit points strongly towards their potential use in helping IDS identify
new attacks. Zang et al [23] drew similar conclusions in their description of honeypots as
a supplemental active defense system for network security. However, current
investigations into integrating honeypots with IDS have primarily used honeypots to
extend a detected intrusion’s session [41,43] by rerouting an attacker (once identified) to
a honeypot.
While not yet in wide use, according to NIST [46], honeypots are now considered
to be part of the intrusion detection product line. According to NIST, as part of an IDS,
honeypots serve as decoy systems that divert an attacker away from critical resources,
collect information about attackers, and encourage the attacker to stay on the system long
enough for administrators to respond.
Another advantage of honeypots is their ability to provide correlated high value
data [1,15,39]. All of the data captured in a honeypot is relevant security data, as
opposed to many other security related logs (such as firewall logs) where the majority of
the data may pertain to normal network operations. In addition, honeypots can provide
easier and more extensive monitoring of attacker’s actions, and can potentially detect
insider threats [5].
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There are three significant disadvantages of using production honeypots. The
most highly debated of these pertains to the unclear legal implication of using such
devices [46,51]. Some argue that honeypots violate entrapment laws; while other argue
they violate forth amendment rights. These concerns can be lessened through the use of
banners, however the issues remain unclear and as yet untested in court. There is also the
more important legal concern that your honeypot maybe compromised, and then used to
attack systems other than your own.
Another potential disadvantage of production honeypots is that if they are
detected they lose much of their value, and may even be used against you. This was not a
problem early on, but as honeypots have grown in use, tools and techniques for detecting
and/or fingerprinting honeypots have become available and openly discussed [3,37].
While making the use of honeypots more difficult, the fact that attackers are spending the
effort to develop such tools and techniques is an indication that they consider honeypots a
legitimate security measure.
A final disadvantage of honeypots is the fact that a high level of expertise is
needed to configure and maintain these systems [3,46]. Initial configuration includes:
determining the number and location of honeypots, what means will be used to attract
traffic to the honeypot(s), determining the level of interaction, choosing an operating
system (actual of virtual), deciding what services should be available or emulated, and
how data is to be captured. On going maintenance includes keeping the honeypots secure
and making sure that the honeypots continue to adequately mirror the production
environment. Improper configuration can also lead to detection, making these issues
doubly important.
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Lance Spitzner has recently addressed some of the disadvantages associated with
honeypots in his proposed concept of a dynamic honeypot [2]. A dynamic honeypot is a
plug and play solution that automatically determines how many honeypots to deploy,
how to deploy them and what they should look like. A dynamic honeypot could address,
at least in part, both the problem of a lack of resources for configuration, and the problem
of detection (which in some, potentially many, cases is directly related to configuration).
By learning and monitoring networks, dynamic honeypots could reduce the amount of
configuration and maintenance needed, and potentially decrease the chance that attackers
would easily detect a honeypot.
Such a dynamic honeypot would learn about the network, and then deploy
honeypots to appropriately blend in with the rest of the network. In addition it could also
continue to monitor the network and update the honeypots based on changes it sees in the
network. For example, if a network has all Windows systems, only Windows honeypots
will be deployed. Later, if a Linux machine is added, miraculously Linux honeypots are
deployed. The goal according to Lance Spitzner is “an appliance, a solution you simply
plug into your network, it deploys the proper number and configuration of honeypots, and
adapts to any changes in your networks.” [2]
Some initial attempts have been made to implement a dynamic honeypot [49,57].
Both of these attempts have used Honeyd [[6] as the honeypot engine, and p0f [8,9] for
passive network analysis. One problem these approaches have discovered is that passive
network analysis (via p0f) is not 100% accurate. Both attempts met with success, but
lacked a specific context in which the dynamic honeypot was to be used.

19

Not all responses to honeypot technology have been positive, Rong and Yang [40]
argue that the potential misuses of honeypot technology by black hats present a threat to
consumer trust in e-commerce (among other things) and therefore the use of honeypots
should proceed with caution.
Initially honeypots were an esoteric security phenomenon, and largely deployed
for intelligence gathering. Lance Spitzner and the Honeynet group have used them to
gather a great deal of information about black hats [1]. Their effectiveness at intelligence
gathering has lead to a desire to incorporate them into production systems [32,38]. While
the use of honeypots in production security systems is still in its infancy, honeypots are
already beginning to show up in commercial security software [19].
A recent paper by Kuwate, Sarj, and Masri, [63] explores the design and
development of a dynamic honeypot. The design is based on Lance Spitzner and the
Honeynet Organization’s proposed concept of a dynamic honeypot [2]. They sight
minimizing configuration and supervision as an important motivation for the
development of a dynamic honeypot. While they do indicate that the dynamic honeypot
can be used for intrusion detection, that functionality was not explored in the paper.
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CHAPTER III
THEORY AND DESIGN
3.1

Honeypots And Intrusion Detection.
There are several aspects of honeypots that make them attractive for intrusion

detection. Most notable is the fact that they innately implement anomaly detection,
which has continued to be both desirable and illusive. Given that most systems generate
lengthy logs everyday, the high value/high correlation aspects of the data generated by
honeypots is also attractive. There are several ways honeypots can be used as part of
production intrusion detection systems.
One approach is to use honeypots as a resource to which to divert malicious
activity [43,46]. This is useful both in consuming attacker’s resources and in potentially
gaining further knowledge about the attacker [59] and possibly the attack. While this
approach can be effective, it could be considered something like a jail to which offenders
are sent after they are caught (and perhaps interrogated). When used this way it is up to
some other systems to identify the malicious traffic, or intrusions. The drawback of this
approach is that it does not take advantage of the native ability of honeypots to do
anomaly detection.
Another approach is to use honeypots for intelligence gathering, deploying
honeypots, then extracting from the honeypot data signatures to be used by the
production intrusion detection system [59]. This approach does make use of some of the
anomaly detection ability of honeypots, in a more “research” oriented approach.
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However, no automated means exists of converting the raw honeypot data into usable
signatures. Therefore, use of such an approach requires a great deal of man-hours from
highly skilled personel. Since there is no necessary correlation between the honeypot and
the production system, it is possible (or likely, depending on how the honeypot was
deployed) that this approach would produce some or many irrelevant signatures.
In order for a honeypots to genuinely carryout intrusion detection, they must be
placed appropriately within a production network (rather than being isolated from it).
Once deployed, any interaction with the honeypot can be considered anomalous, and
therefore intrusive. This approach uses the intrinsic anomaly detection ability of
honeypots to implement intrusion detection. This approach might also be called behavior
based, since it is based on the behavior of systems on the network as they interact with
the honeypot.
The advantage of such an approach is the honeypot’s ability to detect previously
unknown attacks, and minimize false negatives. However, it is possible for an intrusion
to never interact with a honeypot (good deployment should minimize this possibility).
This is one of the drawbacks to honeypots and why identification of honeypots makes
them virtually useless. Therefore the objective of a honeypot based intrusion detection
system is not to replace existing IDS, but instead to compliment current IDS, like snort,
by providing independent, anomaly based, intrusion detection. In addition a honeypot
based intrusion detection system can provide additional data that can be used for
incidence response. Precisely what that data will consist of depends on the level of
interaction of the honeypot.
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Recall that low interaction honeypots can generally only capture transaction level
data, the source and destination of an attack, but that high-level of interaction honeypots
can capture more detailed information ranging from the application layer session data
(which might include commands and exploits) to the contents of files uploaded to a
victim machine. Therefore, a behavior based or anomaly based IDS using a low
interaction honeypot will at most identify the network address and port from which an
intrusion occurred or is occurring. But a higher interaction honeypot will potential
capture more detailed information.
As far as simple detection is concerned, a low-interaction honeypot is just as good
as a high-interaction honeypot. A very simple port monitor listening on unused
(undesignated) IP addresses can detect a connection attempt, indicating an intrusion of
some sort. However, little else could be learned from such a honeypot based IDS. Since
the objective is to provide detection and a resource for incidence response more
information would be helpful, making a high-level interaction honeypots a more
attractive choice.
All other things being equal, a high-level interaction honeypot is obviously the
best choice for use with a behavior based IDS. However there are other elements that
must be taken into account. All honeypots have some risk associated with them, but
high-interaction honeypots have significantly more than low-interaction honeypots, and
an intrusion detection system should ideally not increase the amount of risk associated
with the network it is trying to protect. High interaction honeypots that are used in bait
and switch techniques present little additional risk because they are isolated from the
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production part of the network. A high interaction honeypot within the production part of
the network could pose a serious security risk.
Another important issue to consider is configuration and maintenance. Honeypots
require a great deal of effort to configure and maintain, with high interaction honeypots
being the most difficult to configure and maintain. Usually a high interaction honeypot is
an actual system (or virtual machine) to which an attacker is given full access. However,
even low interaction honeypots take significant effort to deploy and maintain properly. If
the overhead of configuring and maintaining the honeypots is too great then it will not be
practical to deploy them as part of an intrusion detection system. This issue can be
addressed by using a dynamic honeypot.
3.2

Dynamic Honeypots
Recall Lance Spitzner’s description of a dynamic honeypot [2] as a plug and play

solution, capable of determining how many honeypots to deploy, what they should look
like, and deploying them. Furthermore, once deployed, the dynamic honeypot continues
to monitor the network for changes, maintaining the honeypot deployments and keeping
them up to date relative to changes in the network. There are a number of significant
challenges to developing such a system; fortunately there already are existing tools that
address some of these problems.
3.2.1

Passive Network Analysis.
The most significant challenge facing the dynamic honeypot is how it is learns

about the network in which it has been placed. With out such knowledge a dynamic
honeypot is not possible. There are several approaches that could be used here such as
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actively probing the network, using something like Nmap, to determine what systems are
up and what they are running. There are some disadvantages to this approach: you might
miss something that is fire walled, you introduce more traffic onto the network, probing
may cause a system to shutdown unexpectedly, and finally the result of the probe is a
static picture of the network, meaning it will have to be preformed on a regular basis to
keep the knowledge base up to date.
A better approach, advocated by Spitzner, would be to use passive OS
fingerprinting. Passive OS fingerprinting is similar to probing. It maps and identifying
systems on a network, but instead of sending out packets and examining the response,
passive fingerprinting examines captured packets and compares them to a database of
signatures. This approach is much less intrusive and can be carried out continuously to
provide a real-time mapping of the network.
Passive network analysis operates by examining packets from actual or legitimate
sessions instead of generating packets that are apart of its own session. The values of
certain fields, from the TCP header for example, are then compared to known values for
specific operating systems. These known values are called fingerprints. Based on the
fingerprint database, the operating system type for the host that generated the packet can
be established.
P0F is a free open source a passive OS fingerprinting tool written by Michal
Zalewski, and can be used to carry out passive network analysis for the dynamic
honeypot. It uses numerous different metrics for fingerprint identification that are
supposed to give it a high degree of accuracy. There are actually three modes of
operation: incoming connection fingerprinting, outgoing connection fingerprinting, and
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outgoing connection refused fingerprinting, corresponding to the SYN, SYN/ACK, and
RST parts of the TCP handshake. P0f operates on single packets, and generated the
following output, shown in figure 3.1, when run on a test LAN.
<Sun
->
<Sun
->

Mar 28 22:47:19 2004> 192.168.1.101:6000 - Linux recent 2.4 (2)
192.168.1.100:44003 (distance 0, link: ethernet/modem)
Mar 28 22:51:37 2004> 192.168.1.23:5000 - Windows 2000 Professional
192.168.1.100:57615 (distance 0, link: ethernet/modem)

Figure 3.1. Sample p0f output.
In this example, the host 192.168.1.101 has been fingerprinted as “Linux recent 2.4 (2)”,
and the host 192.168.1.23 has been fingerprinted as “Windows 2000.”
3.2.2

Virtual Honeypot Deployment
Another challenge for the dynamic honeypot is that to be truly effective, the

dynamic honeypot will be deploying multiple honeypots. While individual machines
could be used for each honeypot and deployed throughout the network, this is obviously
impractical on many levels and could hardly be construed as plug and play. Instead, a
much more desirable solution would be for a single appliance to deploy multiple virtual
honeypots on a network’s unused IP addresses. The open source solution Honeyd [6] has
exactly this ability.
Honeyd is a very powerful, very configurable honeypot solution. Configuration is
done through a configuration file, specified in the command line. Honeyd allows for the
definition of various “personalities” which are then bound to an IP address. The OS
simulation for each personality is based on the NMAP finger print file, giving Honeyd
the ability to emulate over 500 different operating systems. For each personality port
actions are defined for TCP, UDP, and ICMP.
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The response options for ports are open, block, reset. Block does not respond to a
connection attempt, reset closes a connection attempt, and open creates a connection.
When a port is open incoming data is allowed, but not captured by Honeyd. Honeyd
sends out no application data and the connection remains open till closed by the source.
In addition to these options, an executable can be attached to a specific protocol and port.
This creates an open port with incoming data forwarded to the executable and output
from the executable forwarded to the source through using I/O redirection and standard
I/O. In the example listed in figure 3.2, test.sh is a script that just echoes back to the
sender whatever it receives.
#Sample Configuration
create windows
set personality windows “Windows NT SP4 – SP5”
set windows default tcp action block
set windows default udp action reset
set windows default icmp action block
set windows tcp port 137 action open
add windows tcp port 1006 “scripts/test.sh”
bind 192.168.1.110 windows

Figure 3.2. Sample Honeyd configuration.
You can specify to Honeyd on the command line an IP range on which to operate.
If none is specified it will attempt to respond to any packet it sees. Individual
personalities are bound to specific IP addresses, as seen in the above example: bind
192.168.1.110 windows. There must be a default personality defined as well, which is
used for connection attempts to IP addresses for which no specific personality has been
bound.
Unless traffic is specifically routed to Honeyd, arpd must be used to attract traffic
to the honeypot. Arpd responds to unused IP addresses (the range of which is given in
the command line) with the system’s MAC address, which means any traffic not destined
for an actual host will end up at the system running arpd and therefore be seen by
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Honeyd. For example arpd 192.168.1.0/24 will respond to the arp protocol “who-has”
for any address between 192.168.1.1-192.168.1.255 for which no other system responds.
Honeyd also has some dynamic capabilities that can be accessed through the
configuration file. This gives Honeyd the ability to create different virtual honeypots
based on the source’s IP address, operating system, or time of day. These dynamic
honeypots are then bound to an IP address, and respond with different templates based on
the condition given in the configuration.
3.3

A Dynamic Honeypot Design
The initial dynamic honeypot design takes into account the functionality of p0f

and Honeyd. Recall that the goal of the dynamic honeypot it to determine how many
honeypots to deploy, where to deploy them and what they should look like to blend in
with the surrounding environment. Figure 3.3 shows the basic elements needed for a
dynamic honeypot.
The passive network analysis module carries out passive network analysis,
specifically OS fingerprinting. It will sniff packets directly off the wire and place the
results into the dynamic honeypot database, the collection of information about the
network that represents what the dynamic honeypot has learned about the network. It
will use p0f to passively fingerprint systems based on packets sniffed from the network.
This must include a set of IP addresses and the operating systems associated with them,
as well as a list of open ports associated with each host. This information will be stored
in the dynamic honeypot database.
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Figure 3.3. Model for a dynamic honeypot design.
The honeypot deployment module will deploy the virtual honeypots, based on
some given configuration. It will be able to simulate a variety of different OS and deploy
honeypots on multiple IP addresses from a single network connection. This module will
consist almost entirely of Honeyd, with the virtual honeypot definitions taking the form
of Honeyd style configuration templates and bindings
The configuration module will use the data from the network mapping storage to
create the virtual honeypot definitions. A virtual honeypot definition will consist of an IP
address, an OS, and a set of open ports. Configuration will be achieved by grouping the
existing hosts together based on their OS type and the distance between their IP
addresses. Each group of hosts will then have an associated honeypot that has the same
(or similar) OS as the group members. The open ports on that honeypot will include all
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open ports of each host in the group. Finally the IP address of the honeypot must be
similar to those of the group, but cannot be an IP address already in use. In order to
maintain consistency with the current network, the honeypot definitions will be updated
at regular intervals.
3.4

Intrusion Detection Using A Dynamic Honeypot
Having designed a dynamic honeypot, we now return to using it to carry out

intrusion detection. Once deployed, the network interface on which the dynamic
honeypot is listening will be sniffed. Ideally any and all traffic seen will constitute an
intrusion. In reality it is likely that even if there are no intrusions (insider threat and
internal compromised host count as an intrusion), there may be traffic to the honeypot.
Such benign traffic would still reflect some error in the network somewhere, and
reporting it should help administrators identify the source of the problem. It is therefore
reasonable to capture all the traffic using some kind of packet sniffer, and for all traffic to
merit some kind of alarm, if not a red alert. In addition it might be useful to look for
known intrusion signatures since these may have eluded the defenses elsewhere.
We have yet to resolve the issue of what level of interaction the honeypot is to be.
Honeyd is generally a low to medium interaction honeypot, capable of port monitoring or
passing payload data to a script or executable. However Honeyd can also use the “proxy”
action to pass a connection to another system entirely. By using the proxy action for a
port it is possible for Honeyd to achieve a high-level of interaction, by proxying to an
actual system. While that system could be one of various high-interaction honeypots
(isolated from the rest of the network), it could also be an actual host in the production
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network. The issue that must first be addressed is how this might impact the security of
the existing network.
Using the dynamic template ability it is possible to have the honeypots react
differently depending on whether the connection host is apart of the internal or external
network. This makes it possible to use a higher level of interaction for internal hosts, or a
lower level of interaction for external hosts. In this way the dynamic honeypot can use
hosts on the internal network as high-interaction proxies when connecting systems are
located with in the internal network, and use just simple open ports or scripts to emulate
services when the connection host is apart of the external network.
This does not add unreasonable additional risk even though the honeypot is
redirecting traffic to a production system. Since the source is coming from the internal
network, whichever host the honeypot proxies is also directly reachable from the source.
Therefore the honeypot does not introduce additional risk by using proxies for internal
sources only. Forwarding external hosts to internal host would represent a serious
increase in the risk for the internal network, and must be avoided.
This approach may decrease the amount of time it takes for an internally
compromised machine to find additional hosts to compromise, but in so doing it should
also significantly decrease the period of time before such an event is noticed. In addition,
the honeypot will capture the entire session, and isolate it from any production host. This
should aid in incidence response and potentially provide good forensic evidence that can
be easily preserved without disturbing any production hosts. In addition efforts to secure
and maintain the production systems at the same time secures and maintains the highinteraction honeypots.
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Using low interaction honeypots for external hosts also makes good sense. They
are the most secure kind of honeypot, and therefore the least likely to be compromised. If
the source of an intrusion is from the external network, then the primary goal of the
honeypot based IDS is to identify the intrusion, which a low-interaction honeypot can do
adequately. Scripts or executables could be used to emulate various services, and the
dynamic honeypot will facilitate them being associated with the appropriate ports.
However, they are not absolutely necessary and do pose certain risks. Very simple
emulators lack realism, and are probably easily fingerprinted, even by automated attacks.
More complex emulators, while much more realistic, have greater potential to be
compromised, and introduce unwanted additional risk. Using just the port listening
capabilities of Honeyd will capture any and all payloads pushed to the honeypot. While
this type of connection lacks realism, it hardly gives itself away sense it does not respond
at all.
It is also makes sense to treat the internal and external networks differently from
the perspective of intrusion detection. Connection from an external host is a good
indication of a mis-configured firewall or border security measure. Connection from an
internal host is likely indication of an insider threat or a compromised host on the internal
network.
To use the dynamic honeypot to carry out intrusion detection once the dynamic
honeypot has been deployed, the interface on which the honeypot is listening must be
sniffed. This traffic is the high value data that will be used for intrusion detection. Since
all traffic to a honeypot is anomalous the need to identify anomalous events vs. normal
traffic is eliminated. Therefore a simple reporting mechanism that presents the raw
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traffic data would be sufficient for intrusion detection. However, additional processing of
the traffic data is also possible.
Additional processing could take the form of applying a set of rules to the honeypot
data. These rules would define an intrusion in terms of honeypot traffic. An alarm or
alert that an intrusion has occurred would be generated when the conditions of one of the
rules was met. For example: if the majority of the traffic is coming from a single host, or
if an individual host is interacting with multiple honeypots on the same port. A potential
set of rules was developed, and is listed in appendix D. A layout of the dynamic
honeypot intrusion detection system is listed in figure 3.4.
Network Bridge
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p0f
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Snort

Dynamic
Honeypot
configuration
engine

Alert
Database

Network
Data
Extraction

Dynamic
Honeypot
Database

Web interface to
alerts provided by
ACID

Figure 3.4. Design for dynamic honeypot intrusion
detection.
The network interface on which the dynamic honeypot listens is the internal
interface, the same interface to which production systems are physically connected. The
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sniffer captures all packets bound for the honeypots and logs them. Snort is excellent for
packet capture and has become the sniffer of choice for many honeypot deployments.
Once packets are captured they are passed to the log/alert/alarm mechanisms. All packets
will be logged for future reference, incidence response, and forensics. The alert and
alarm mechanisms generate the output of the intrusion detection system. Since it has
been established that all traffic to the honeypots is anomalous and potentially indicative
of an intrusion, one of these mechanisms will output all traffic to the honeypots. Another
mechanism will perform some additional analysis of the traffic by apply some rules to the
honeypot traffic.
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CHAPTER IV
IMPLEMENTATION

An intrusion detection system based on a dynamic honeypot was implemented for
a small LAN. This first required the implementation of a dynamic honeypot. Once
deployed, the dynamic honeypot was used to carryout anomaly based intrusion detection
by monitoring all traffic coming into the dynamic honeypot[s]. The dynamic honeypot
was developed using C++ on Red Hat’s Fedora core 2 Linux distribution, kernel 2.6. The
LAN consisted of a Belkin router, a Linksys router, three Linux systems, a Windows
2000 system, and a Windows XP system connected to the Internet through a high-speed
cable modem.
4.1

Dynamic Honeypot Implementation
There are three key elements that must be addressed by the implementation:

gathering information about the network, generating honeypot definitions from gathered
information, and finally deploying the honeypots. This dynamic honeypot
implementation was an integration of some existing solutions with the implementation of
a solution that generates honeypot definition from network information. Existing tools,
specifically p0f and Honeyd, were used rather than re-implementing these partial
solutions. Since there did not exist a publicly available tool for generating honeypot
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definitions from network information, this part of the dynamic honeypot was
implemented from scratch.
4.1.1

Gathering Network Information
Recall that it was determined that p0f would be used to carryout passive network

analysis. Since passive network analysis will be an ongoing process, storing the results in
some type of database will facilitate sharing that information with other parts of the
dynamic honeypot. MySQL was chosen as the database, and several tables were created
to store the various information. One table, called host, holds the IP address, operating
system fingerprint, the number times this host has been fingerprinted as this operating
system, and the time the last fingerprint was made. Another table, called ports, has fields
IP address and port number that contain all the open ports for each host, associated by IP
address. The configuration of these tables is given in figure 4.1; the field service and app
of the ports table are not used in this implementation.
mysql> desc host;
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| Field | Type
| Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| ipaddr | int(10) unsigned |
| PRI | 0
|
|
| os
| varchar(255)
|
| PRI |
|
|
| count | int(11)
| YES |
| NULL
|
|
| last
| datetime
| YES |
| NULL
|
|
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> desc ports;
+---------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| Field
| Type
| Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+---------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| ipaddr | int(10) unsigned |
| PRI | 0
|
|
| port
| smallint(6)
|
| PRI | 0
|
|
| service | text
| YES |
| NULL
|
|
| app
| text
| YES |
| NULL
|
|
+---------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Figure 4.1. Host and port table definitions.
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Since p0f lacks a native MySQL interface, the output was piped into a secondary
program that extracted the relevant data and inserted it into the database. Both the SYN
and SYN/ACK modes of p0f were used. This was necessary since a server might never
initiate a connection, and would subsequently not be fingerprinted by the SYN mode of
p0f. When p0f cannot fingerprint a particular packet, it labels its operating system as
‘UNKNOWN’ followed by the associated fingerprinting values for that packet. It is
possible to suppress this feature using the –U option, which was used in this
implementation.
Unfortunately p0f is not 100% accurate or deterministic. It is possible that one
packet generated by a host will be fingerprinted as Windows NT, while another might be
“Windows XP” (or potentially Linux 2.2, but this is much less likely). P0f also appends
additional data separated by a comma or inside parenthesis, for example ‘(2)’ for a
second fingerprint for the same operating system. To simplify matters slightly once a
comma, parenthesis, or bracket was encountered in the operating system string, the
remainder of the string (including the symbol) was truncated. This effectively produced
OS labels like Windows XP, Linux 2.1-2.4, where the main operating system type, i.e.
Windows, Linux, AIX, BSD, etc. was listed first. This approach allowed a single host, or
IP address, to have more than one associated operating system fingerprint.
Recall that a dynamic honeypot will need to decide what port should be open on
each honeypot. Therefore the passive network analysis module needs to generate a set of
open ports for each host. The output of p0f does included port numbers; however these
could just as likely be ephemeral ports or open ports. It makes no sense to have open
ephemeral ports, and including them in a honeypot definition could potentially give away
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the honeypot. Unfortunately there is not enough information in the p0f output to
distinguish between a server port and an ephemeral or client port.
For TCP packets, the SYN/ACK flag combination indicates that the source host is
listening on that TCP port. Thus tcpdump can be used to find server ports, at least for
TCP. This was achieved by selecting only those packets where byte 13 in the TCP
header has value 18 (10010, 0x12). This can be achieved using tcpdump with the
following options:
tcpdump –nn ‘TCP[13] == 18’
Determining listening ports for UDP and ICMP will be more difficult, so for this project
we will focus on TCP only (this is hardly unreasonable since TCP is by far the most
commonly used protocol). Once the packets have been selected, then extracting the
source address and port is simple, and the result can be inserted into the honeypot
database.
The dynamic honeypot will want to fingerprint as many possible systems on the
local network as possible. A single interface on the local network, even running in
promiscuous mode, is not sufficient to capture all the traffic even on small network, and
for larger networks would be even more inadequate. Some kind of interface must be used
that makes sure that all network traffic can be seen by p0f. Two possibilities for
improving the scope of the traffic available to p0f are using a spanning port or a bridge.
A spanning port receives all the traffic flowing through a router or a switch, allowing p0f
to see traffic to all systems connect to the switch or router. A bridge connects to network
segments, and all traffic between the two segments must cross the bridge, allowing p0f to
see traffic to all systems connected through the bridge.
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The bridge was chosen for several reasons: It doesn’t rely on someone to
correctly identify (and configure) the spanning port on a network switch. It allows the
dynamic honeypot to become a device that you physically place in front of the network
on which you want it to operate. It operates at the link layer, making it a stealth device,
meaning that not only can it not be seen; neither is it necessary to make any changes to
routers or host [60]. Finally, it could eventually carryout intrusion prevention since it has
control over what flows in and out of the local network. Figure 4.2 shows the
construction of the LAN. The Belkin router and its systems are the internal or
productions network on which the dynamic honeypot will be deployed. The Windows
XP system is a part of the external network, and interacts with the dynamic honeypot and
the internal network the same as a remote host on the Internet.
Local interface connection

Internet

Bridge
Linksys Router
Dynamic Honeypot

Windows XP

Bridge

Linux Server

Belkin Router

Linux Workstation

Windows 2000

Figure 4.2. Configuration of the development and test
network.
Using a bridge will require two additional interfaces. The bridge will use two
interfaces, and the third interface will be connected to the internal network as if it were
any other normal host. The bridge will be connected between the top-level router/switch
for the internal network, and the perimeter connection from the ISP or a firewall. The
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honeypots will be deployed through the interface that is connected to the internal
network, as seen in figure 4.3.
Another issue that must be addressed at some point is differentiating between the
local network, on which we want to deploy honeypots, and the external network. While
it is clear in figure 4.3 that network interface 1 is the WAN connection and interface 2 is
the LAN connection, this is not inherently obvious from the perspective of the bridge.
Interface 1 and 2 could be switched and have no effect on how the bridge performs or
how it views packets. The dynamic honeypot must have some means of deciding which
IP address (seen on the bridge) are apart of the local network, and which are not.
Dynamic Honeypot
Network
interface 1

WAN
Internet

Bridge

Network
interface 2

LAN
Internal Network

Network
interface 3

Figure 4.3. The use of interfaces in the dynamic honeypot.
This does not necessarily have to be addressed during passive network analysis; it
could be addressed when the honeypots are being configured. In this case the dynamic
honeypot would be trying to fingerprint every host on the internal and external network.
While this might provide some useful incidence response information, at this point it is
superfluous, and undesirable. Instead, it would be better during passive network analysis
to filter out everything but systems on the local network. It would appear that this should
be very easy to do because of the bridge.
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Unfortunately there is really no simple method of determining direction of flow
on the bridge. However, if the mac address of the internal switch or router were known,
then traffic could be filtered at the link layer. This was achieved by filtering traffic on the
bridge based on the address and mask of the local network interface (network interface 3)
and extracting the source’s mac address. Assuming that the bridge connects to some type
of router, filtering at the link layer for packets whose link layer source is this mac address
will filter out all hosts not apart of the local network. For this implementation a single
router, switch, or hub will be assumed. (It is possible that there might be additional
devices all directly connected to the bridge, which would simply mean filtering for all
these devices’ mac addresses as well.)
Since it may happen that some hosts are not fingerprinted at all, and it is
important that honeypots are not assigned an IP address already in use, it would be
advantageous to have a separate list of all hosts on the internal network, even if they have
not been fingerprinted. This was achieved by adding another table to the database, called
flock, which consists of two fields, an IP address, and a timestamp. Values are inserted
into the table by extracting the relevant IP address from a continuous tcpdump stream that
implements the appropriate link layer filter. The processes that insert the operating
system data and port data can first check to make sure that the host is in the internal
network using this list. In addition, honeypots can consult this table to make sure they
are not binding to an IP address already in use.
Tcpdump and p0f are launched in daemon mode and their output is piped into an
executable that extracts the relative data and inserts it into the database. This processes
continues indefinitely, and the timestamps in the flock and host tables are used by the
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dynamic honeypot to select only up to date information. This process results in the three
tables flock, host, and ports being filled. A sample result is shown in figure 4.4. This
part of the dynamic honeypot will run independently for a period of time, so that the
database is adequately populated.
mysql> select inet_ntoa(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+--------------+-----------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+--------------+-----------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
118 | 2004-09-07 12:33:09 |
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+
|
94 | 2004-09-07 11:06:24 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
27 | 2004-09-07 11:51:25 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
18 | 2004-09-07 12:39:43 |
+--------------+-----------------------+-------+---------------------+
4 rows in set (0.03 sec)
mysql> select inet_ntoa(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+--------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+--------------+------+
| 192.168.2.16 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 445 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.62 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 |
+--------------+------+
16 rows in set (0.02 sec)
mysql> select inet_ntoa(ipaddr) as ipaddr,time from flock;
+--------------+--------------+
| ipaddr
| time
|
+--------------+--------------+
| 192.168.2.16 | 040907130248 |
| 192.168.1.98 | 040908100631 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 040907130248 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 040907120331 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 040907130248 |
| 192.168.2.1 | 040907130248 |
+--------------+--------------+

Figure 4.4. Contents of the host, ports, and flock tables as a
result of passive network analysis
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4.1.2

Generating Honeypot Definitions.
Once the host table and port tables have been populated the processes of

configuring the honeypots begins. Based on the values in host and ports, the dynamic
honeypot must make the following determinations:
•
•
•
•

How many honeypots to deploy?
What the OS personality each honeypot should have?
What the IP address of each honeypot will be?
What TCP ports should be open?

To make these determinations a simple rule based approach was taken that addresses
each problem incrementally. A very simple set of rules was developed and is listed in
appendix C. These rules were then implemented in a C++ program that interfaces with
the dynamic honeypot database.
The information needed to define each honeypot will be stored in the dynamic
honeypot database. Three tables, honeypots, honeyhosts, and honeyports will be used.
The table honeypots will have the following fields: honeypot id, IP address and operating
system. The honeypot id is a unique integer identifier for each honeypot, the IP address
and operating system will be the operating system personality for the honeypot, and the
IP address will be the IP address to which the honeypot is bound. The honeyports table
will have fields: honeypot id, port, and proxy. A description of each table is given in
figure 4.5.
To establish the number of honeypots to deploy, all hosts are partitioned into
groups, and a honeypot is created for each group. Two characteristics will be used in
determining group membership for each actual host: 1) the distance between the IP
addresses of the hosts in the group and 2) the similarity between the operating systems as
determined by p0f during passive network analysis. Each host is evaluated individually
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to determine the group to which it will belong. If there does not exist a group to which
the host belongs, a new group is created and the host is placed in that group.
Initially there are no groups, so the first host is placed in a new group. Then each
successive host is analyzed to see if it is a member of an already existing group using a
membership function that returns the group to which that host belongs, or –1 if it does not
belong to any group. The membership function examines the IP address distance
between the current host and hosts in other groups and the operating system type of the
current host and the operating systems type of hosts in other groups.
mysql> desc honeypots;
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| Field | Type
| Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| hpid
| int(11)
|
| PRI | 0
|
|
| ipaddr | int(10) unsigned | YES |
| NULL
|
|
| os
| varchar(255)
| YES |
| NULL
|
|
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> desc honeyhosts;
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| Field | Type
| Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| hpid
| int(11)
|
| PRI | 0
|
|
| ipaddr | int(10) unsigned |
| PRI | 0
|
|
+--------+------------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> desc honeyports;
+--------+-------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| Field | Type
| Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+--------+-------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| hpid
| int(11)
|
| PRI | 0
|
|
| port
| smallint(6) |
| PRI | 0
|
|
| proxy | varchar(40) | YES |
| NULL
|
|
| script | varchar(80) | YES |
| NULL
|
|
+--------+-------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
4 rows in set (0.01 sec)
mysql> desc scripts;
+--------+--------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| Field | Type
| Null | Key | Default | Extra |
+--------+--------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
| port
| smallint(6) |
| PRI | 0
|
|
| script | varchar(255) |
| PRI |
|
|
| os
| varchar(40) | YES |
| NULL
|
|
+--------+--------------+------+-----+---------+-------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Figure 4.5. Honeypots, honeyports, honeyhosts, and scripts
table definitions.
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In order for two hosts to be members of the same group the distance between their
IP addresses must be less than a predetermined threshold. This distance threshold is a
percentage of the average distance between the actual hosts, which is determined by
dividing the total address space by the number of hosts. The result of such a function
forces more densely populated networks to be more discriminating in their group
selection and vice versa. The size of the address space is determined by finding the
highest order bit that differs among the hosts, the address space then being 2 to that
power.
This approach actually generates an address space that is possibly much smaller
than the actual address space, but yields a more useful average distance. For example,
given the host addresses: 192.168.1.16, 192.168.1.22, and 192.168.1.40 on a
192.168.1.0/24 subnet, the actual address space is 255 giving an average distance of 85,
which is much greater than the distance between any of the hosts. However, only 6 bits
are used to distinguish the hosts, yielding an address space of 64 and an average distance
of approximately 21, which is closer to the observed distances. Were there to be an
additional host at 192.168.1.250 this would result in an average distance of 64, making it
more likely the initial hosts would be grouped together. The threshold distance used for
membership is a percentage of the average distance, initially set at 75%. In theory, a
higher percentage should produce fewer groups and subsequently fewer honeypots, and
vice versa.
The comparison between two operating system strings is based on the general
operating system class, such as Linux, or Windows. This will always be the initial
substring that contains no white space. Since all the values are stored in the MySQL
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database, the LIKE function can be used in conjunction with a select statement for
comparison. The LIKE function is not case sensitive; in addition the ‘%’ is appended to
the string so that it will match to any other operating systems type that begins with that
general class. For example LIKE ‘Linux%’ will match with any other operating system
type that begins with Linux, e.g.: Linux 2.4, or Linux 1.9.
While there is no reason that a host cannot be a member of more that one group, it
was decided that each host should only belong to one group. Therefore, if a host meets
the membership requirements for more than one existing group, the distance threshold is
divided by 2 and the membership function is called again. This processes is repeated
recursively till the host belongs to only one or zero groups. In the case of zero, the host
will be considered a member of one of the groups from the previous match. At the end of
this process, each host on the network will be associated with some group, called the
honeypot group.
Next, each honeypot group needs to be assigned an operating system. Honeyd
uses the Nmap fingerprint database to simulate different operating system TCP/IP
implementations, so the operating system needs to be selected from possible Nmap
operating system fingerprints. All possible Nmap fingerprint names are placed in a table
called osfinger. For each group, the operating system with the highest count is selected
from all the hosts in that group. Then the operating system type is extracted and all
possible Nmap fingerprints are selected that match the operating system type. Further
matching continues by successively appending an additional character from the original
operating system fingerprint string until no matches are found or the end of the string is
reached, and the result of the previous comparison is used as the final match. For
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example: LIKE ‘Linux 1%’, LIKE ‘Linux 1.%’, and LIKE ‘Linux 1.2%’ would be
generated from the operating system string ‘Linux 1.2’. This process should result in a
limited set of potential candidates from which the personality is chosen at random.
Next, an unused IP address must be selected for each group, this will be the IP
address of the honeypot associated with that group. It would be desirable for the IP
address to closely resemble the IP addresses of the hosts in the group. Therefore the rule
for selecting an IP address begins by identifying only those bits that are not the same for
each host. For groups that only have one host, the zero bits of the subnet mask from the
local interface will be used. A candidate IP address is generated by flipping one or more
of these bits in the IP address of one of the hosts in the group. To become the group’s IP
address, the candidate IP address must not already be in use by any of the physical
systems on the network, including the dynamic honeypot systems, or by any other group.
For each honeypot group, the open or listening ports (TCP only for this
implementation) come from the hosts associated with that honeypot. Recall that during
passive network analysis the dynamic honeypot is populating a table listing the open
ports associated with each host. For each honeypot group, its open ports are all the open
ports associated with any host that is a member of the group. These ports are determined
by selecting all elements from the ports table whose IP address is in the current honeypot
group.
4.1.3

Deploying The Honeypots
Recall that we have already decided that Honeyd will be used to deploy virtual

honeypots. Therefore the dynamic honeypot will create a configuration file for Honeyd
based on the results of determinations it has made previously and stored in the dynamic
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honeypot database. When Honeyd is launched it will read this file and deploy the
honeypots, see figure 3.2 in section 3 for a sample configuration.
Recall that the dynamic honeypot will respond differently depending on whether
the source of the connection is coming from the internal or external network. To achieve
this each group or honeypot will have two definitions, one to be used when the source is
external, and one to be used when the source is internal. Each Honeyd honeypot
definition must be given a distinct name when it is created, so the honeypot id number
(hpid) will be placed between ‘honeypot’ and either ‘external’ or ‘internal’ depending on
which is appropriate. The first line of a Honeyd configuration is “create name”, where
‘name’ is the name of that definition. Using the naming convention above the dynamic
honeypot will begin the configuration definition will lines like ‘create
honeypot20internal’ and ‘create honeypot20external’.
Each definition, external or internal, will use the same personality, which has
already been determined and stored in the honeypots table. For example: set
honeypot20internal personality “Windows 2000 SP2” and set honeypot20external
personality “Windows 2000 SP2”. They will both also use the same default port actions,
blocking by default TCP and UDP ports, but leaving ICMP open. Figure 4.6 shows these
elements from a sample configuration generated by the dyamic honeypot.
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open

Figure 4.6. Definition of default tcp, udp, and icmp actions
in Honeyd.
Once the default setting have been given, the actions for individual ports can be given.
This is where the open ports for each honeypot group come into play.
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For the external definition an open port can simply be declared as open, which
will cause Honeyd to complete the connection handshake, but make no response to any
incoming data. Recall from the previous discussion that Honeyd also allows scripts or
executables to be attached to an open port using standard I/O. These scripts will be
exposed to the external network, so some degree of caution is merited in their use.
Complex scripts might contain unknown vulnerabilities flows, and so are avoided here.
However, simple scripts that give at least some sense of realism are appropriate. For
example, port 22 is typically SSH, and when a client opens an SHH connection, the
server responds with a banner like: “SSH-1.99-OpenSSH_3.3p1.” A script to send such a
banner is trivial to implement and since it processes no input, it will be very difficult if
not impossible to exploit (never say never).
Simple scripts for SSH, FTP, and MySQL were written to provide the appropriate
server responses. However not all servers push initial data on their own, for example,
HTTP and NET BIOS. But some simple emulation scripts for HTTP do exist, which
respond with the HTTP/1.1 400 Bad request. iis.sh [56], by Fabian Bieker, is one such
script, and was chosen for its simplicity. NET BIOS, being proprietary, is less
understood, and no scripts will be used to simulate it.
To attach the scripts to the Honeyd definition, another table, called scripts, was
created. It has two fields port and script, where port is the port number for that script, 22
for SSH etc. Script contains the full path to the executable, and any necessary arguments.
Honeyd supports the following tokens for variable expansion: ipsrc, ipdst, sport, and
dport. This allows the source address and destination address to be passed as argument to
the scripts, which can use them to annotate the log files to which they write. The script
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table can be accessed when the honeypot definition is being created, and if a script is
available it will be used, otherwise the keyword open will be used. A sample definition is
given in figure 4.7.
add
add
add
add

honeypot30extern
honeypot30extern
honeypot30extern
honeypot30extern

tcp
tcp
tcp
tcp

port
port
port
port

22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
111 open
3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
6000 open

Figure 4.7. Adding additional open ports and actions to
Honeyd.
For the internal definition, each open port will have a proxy to some internal host.
This is exactly the information stored in the ports table when it is used to determine the
open ports for each honeypot group. Therefore when the honeyports table is being
created, besides inserting port numbers, a proxy for each port is also inserted into the
proxy field. An example of a complete definition is shown in figure 4.8.
create honeypot20intern
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025

Figure 4.8. Complete Honeyd style honeypot definition.
Using the dynamic feature of Honeyd, both the internal and external definition for
each honeypot can be bound to the same IP address, which has already been selected.
This requires the creation of a third honeypot definition, whose name must be unique.
The naming convention used is ‘honeypot’ followed by the honeypot id, for example
create dynamic honeypot20. The previous internal and external honeypot definitions are
conditionally bound to this dynamic template, as shown in figure 4.9. The condition
source ip = 192.168.2.0/26 is determined from the IP address and subnet mask of the
local interface at the time the dynamic honeypot is launched.
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dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot20

Figure 4.9. Conditional binding of different honeypots to
one IP address in Honeyd.
Each honeypot group then has three definitions associated with it: an internal
definition, and external definition, and a dynamic template that determines when to use
the internal and external definitions. A complete set of definitions for one honeypot is
shown in figure 4.10.
create honeypot20intern
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025
create honeypot20extern
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows 2000 SP2"
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open
dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot20

Figure 4.10. Complete honeypot definition.
Once the configuration file has been written, the dynamic honeypot can launch
Honeyd to deploy the virtual honeypots. Honeyd reads the configuration file and deploys
the honeypots. The dynamic honeypot must also launch aprd to enable the binding of
honeypots to unused IP space on the subnet. During this process passive analysis is still
going on in the background, so the process can be repeated at regular intervals to keep the
dynamic honeypot up to date with changes in the network. Prior to updating the
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definitions, the dynamic honeypot removes any honeypots that have been fingerprinted as
actual hosts.
4.2

Anomaly Based Intrusion Detection
Recall from figure 3.2, that to implement intrusion detection a sniffer will be

deployed to capture traffic coming into the dynamic honeypot. The discussion of the
design in section 3.3 identified two approaches for generating intrusion alerts based on
the honeypot traffic. Since all the traffic is anomalous, by definition of a honeypot, an
intrusion alert can defined as any interaction with the honeypot. To implement this
approach, the output of the intrusion detection system is simply a listing of the traffic to
the honeypot. The second approach involved generating alerts based on some data
analysis of the honeypot traffic. Applying a set of rules was proposed as one data
analysis technique, and a potential set of rules was developed and is listed in appendix D.
In this case intrusion alerts will be generated by a set of rules applied to the honeypot
traffic.
Snort was selected to capture the traffic to the honeypots. Snort is an open source
network based intrusion detection system that can also be used for packet capture. It is
commonly used by the Honeynet project to capture honeypot traffic, and it was deployed
to listen on the same interface as Honeyd. A MySQL database was chosen to be the
repository of sniffed packets, and Snort is capable of inserting the captured traffic directly
into the database. The database will store the alerts, generated by Snort, representing all
the traffic to the honeypot. Snort was also configured to log every packet to a tcpdump
file.
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Snort is packet based, that is, it operates on single packet at a time. To each
packet it captures it applies rules. To configure Snort to log everything the following rule
was used:
Log ip any any <> any any

This tells Snort to log any IP based packet from any host on any port to any host on any
port. The log output was configured to be a tcpdump file.
4.2.1

Reporting The Honeypot Traffic

To implement the intrusion detection approach, where an intrusion is any interaction with
the honeypot, a similar alert rule can be added to Snort.
alert ip any any -> any any

Since Snort is sniffing the local interface on which Honeyd is deployed, alerts
should only occur for the honeypots. However, the above rule generates alerts for ports
which are not open on any of the honeypots, and it is possible that it may even alert on IP
addresses not bound to any specific honeypot because of how arpd operates. A better
rule would limit itself to the established honeypots and their ports.
This is achieved by having the dynamic honeypot define a variable HOME_NET
to be a list of the honeypot IP addresses. This variable definition is written to a separate
file that is included in the snort configuration file. Unfortunately Snort does not presently
have the ability to define multiple ports as a variable (only port ranges or single ports).
Any time the dynamic honeypot updates the HOME_NET variable, it sends a signal to
Snort, telling it to re-read its configuration file. This keeps HOME_NET up to date
within Snort. It is now possible to write a rule that captures only traffic destined for one
of the honeypots:

53

alert tcp any -> $HOME_NET any

Using the TCP qualifier makes the rule only apply when a connection or
connection attempt is made using TCP, which is the only protocol of concern for this
implementation. This rule will still alert on traffic to non-honeypot ports (i.e., port scans,
etc.) and on traffic that is not a part of an established connection. The flow preprocessor
can be used to further address some of these issues, especially since this implementation
is only concerned with TCP. Using the flow preprocessor the above rule can be limited
to established connections flowing to the server.
Alert tcp any -> $HOME_NET any (msg:”honeypot traffic”;
flow:to_server,established;)

This rule will cause Snort to generate an alert called “honeypot traffic”, for each
TCP packet that is part of an established connection to one of the honeypots. Snort was
configured to place these alerts in a MySQL database. This rule implements the simplest
form of honeypot based intrusion detection, where all traffic is considered anomalous.
The contents of the database are viewed using ACID.
The ACID main console displays, among other things, the total number of alerts,
unique alerts, source and destination addresses, source and destination ports, and a bar
graph indicating the percentage of TCP, UDP and ICMP traffic. From the main console a
single click can produce a listing of all the alerts, only the most recent, or any number of
additional options. From within a listing, clicking on an individual alert brings up a
detailed description of the package that caused the alert including both a hex and ASCII
version of the payload.
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4.2.2

An Additional Alarm Mechanism Based On Honeypot Traffic
An additional alarm mechanism that analyzed the honeypot traffic data was

suggested during design, and some preliminary rules were developed and are listed in
appendix D. There are two categories of rules, transaction rules and session rules. The
transaction rules use only the source and destination IP addresses and ports as inputs.
The rules are intended to provide an analysis of the current honeypot traffic, and identify
suspicious traffic patterns. The session rules apply to the content of the honeypot traffic.
These rules implement conventional intrusion detection by identifying known attacks, or
in the case of rule #4, that conventional intrusion detection failed to generate any alarms
for a specific session with one of the honeypots.
Since the session rules have much in common with conventional intrusion
detection, Snort was used to implement this functionality. Snort was configured to use its
default rules set along with the previously discussed log and alert rules. This applies
conventional intrusion detection techniques to the honeypot traffic. Any alerts generated
by the default rules will be inserted into the same database as the honeypot traffic alerts,
and will subsequently be viewable through ACID. While rule number 4 is not
implemented, the juxtaposition of alerts from Snort’s default rules and the “honeypot
traffic” alert provide essentially the same result. By looking at the source and destination
of an alert and its surrounding alerts, it should be very clear when a session with one of
the honeypots generates only a “honeypot traffic” alert and no alerts from Snort’s default
rule set.
The transaction rules are based on statistical information about traffic to the
honeypot. Snort does not have the capability to generate or process this kind of
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information. Implementing these rules will require a separate process that can access the
database, and generate the appropriate statistics. Since these rules will use percentages
that have yet to be determined, it was decided not to implement them at this time. Instead
future analysis of collected honeypot traffic may help determine values and additional
metrics that could be used to create and implement real-time intrusion detection using
data analysis of honeypot traffic.
The dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system as implemented here consists
of a dynamic honeypot that deploys virtual honeypots on a single interface, and a packet
sniffer, Snort, that captures all traffic on the local interface. All traffic is logged to a
tcpdump file. An intrusion alert, called “honeypot traffic,” is issued for any TCP traffic
that is part of an established connection and flowing to a server. In addition Snort’s
default rule set is used to apply conventional intrusion detection techniques to honeypot
traffic. The “honeypot traffic” alert indicates a network anomaly; other alerts, generated
by default rules, indicate network anomalies that match a previously known attack. The
alerts and the packets that caused them are viewed using ACID.
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CHAPTER V
TESTING AND RESULTS
Before testing the intrusion detection capabilities of the dynamic honeypot, the
dynamic honeypot itself was tested. Three key aspects of the dynamic honeypot were
tested: network analysis, honeypot configuration, and honeypot deployment. Once the
dynamic honeypot was tested, its ability to carry out intrusion detection was tested.
These tests included launching an exploit against a honeypot and an actual host, as well
as exposing parts of the test network to the Internet.
5.1

Testing Network Analysis
The first test of the dynamic honeypot was to tests the performance of its network

analysis. Once the dynamic honeypot was started, the Linux workstation and the
Windows 2000 desktop (see figure 4.2) used a standard browser to connect to and surf
the Internet. Allowing for sufficient time and resources to be used (because of buffers
there is a certain latency between a packet being sniffed of the wire, and the subsequent
insertion into the database) the honeypot database was then independently queried to
examine its contents. The results are shown in figure 5.1.
Both systems (the Linux workstation and the Windows 2000 desktop) were
accurately fingerprinted and inserted into the honeypot database. However, no open ports
(listening ports) were established for either system. Also notice that additional systems,
192.168.2.16 (dynamic honeypot local interface) and 192.168.1.98 (belkin router), were
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included in the flock table. These are actual hosts that were a part of the production
network but for whom no operating system fingerprint was identified. Recall that this
was the intended purpose of the flock table, and it was clearly being filled appropriately.
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
34 | 2004-09-19 18:01:34 |
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
2 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
Empty set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,time from flock;
+--------------+--------------+
| ipaddr
| time
|
+--------------+--------------+
| 192.168.2.16 | 040919175640 |
| 192.168.1.98 | 040919180119 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 040919180119 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 040919180052 |
+--------------+--------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Figure 5.1. Contents of the host, ports, and flock table
following some passive network analysis
The server had yet to be fingerprinted or identified, so the next test was to connect
to it from the external network. This was done using the Windows XP desktop that, as
seen in figure 4.2, was external to the test LAN. The server was running both HTTP and
FTP services and connections to both of these services were made. Since the Linux
workstation was running MySQL, a connection was also made to this service for
comparison. Once these tests were complete, the database was queried again, and the
results are listed in figure 5.2.
There were now open ports listed in the ports table, 80 (HTTP) and 21(FTP) on
the server (192.168.2.40), and 3306 (MySQL) on the Linux workstation (192.168.2.62).
These were in actuality open or listening ports, and were correctly associated with the
appropriate host. The host table contained an additional entry for the server
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(192.168.2.40) that was fingerprinted by the ACK mode of p0f. The server was also
added to the flock table.
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+--------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+--------------+------+
| 192.168.2.40 |
21 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
+--------------+------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
35 | 2004-09-19 19:04:21 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 |
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,time from flock;
+--------------+--------------+
| ipaddr
| time
|
+--------------+--------------+
| 192.168.2.16 | 040920084215 |
| 192.168.1.98 | 040920084215 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 040920084215 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 040919180052 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 040920084215 |
+--------------+--------------+
5 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Figure 5.2. Additions to the flock, host, and ports tables
after external connections to servers.
The Windows XP computer and an iBook running OS X were temporarily
connected to the internal LAN to further test the fingerprinting abilities of the dynamic
honeypot. Both systems were correctly fingerprinted (Windows XP as “Windows XP
Pro SP1” and OS X as “BSD 4.5”). The entries in the os field of the host table in both
figure 5.1 and 5.2 show that the dynamic honeypot was truncating any additional
fingerprint information, and inserting the desired operating system type and some
subsequent version information into the dynamic honeypot database. P0f has far too
many fingerprints to test exhaustively, so it was concluded that the dynamic honeypot
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was correctly carrying out passive operating system fingerprinting and inserting the
appropriate information into the honeypot database.
In addition to operating system fingerprinting, network analysis also includes
determining the open or listening ports for each host. From the ports table in figure 5.2 it
is clear that this processes was started, but that it was not complete. The intention was
for additional open or listening ports to be determined over time by analysis of normal
network traffic. To simulate the opening of TCP connections, the normal network
activity that the dynamic honeypot would use to establish additional open ports, Nmap in
full connect mode was run from the dynamic honeypots local interface:
Nmap –sT –e eth0 192.168.2.0/24 –F

Appendix E lists the results of the Nmap scan. The database was queried again and the
resulting host and ports table are listed in figure 5.3.
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
36 | 2004-09-20 11:06:59 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 |
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+--------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+--------------+------+
| 192.168.2.40 |
21 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
+--------------+------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Figure 5.3. Contents of host and ports tables after the
internal nmap scan.
From figure 5.3 it is obvious that the dynamic honeypot was unable to determine
any open or listening ports from the TCP traffic generated by Nmap. Since Nmap was
able to identify the open ports, the problem must be the dynamic honeypot. In fact the
problem was that the traffic was not crossing the bridge, and therefore was not seen by
60

the dynamic honeypot. It was previously determined that using the local interface, in
promiscuous mode, would be insufficient as the only location from which to sniff
packets. To verify that using the local interface in that way would not address the
problem, an additional tcpdump process, listening on the local interface, was piped into
the program that extracts open ports:
Tcpdump –I eth0 ‘tcp[13] == 18’ | port

Nmap was run again, this time from the Linux workstation. This failed to add any
additional open ports to the ports table, proving that the local interface is insufficient for
gathering network information.
To verify that using tcpdump to extract all the open ports does work, Nmap was
again run, this time from the external Windows XP machine, which forced all the Nmap
traffic across the bridge. The results of the Nmap scan are listed in appendix F. Once the
Nmap scan was complete the dynamic honeypot database was queried again. The
resulting tables are listed in figure 5.4.
This time the dynamic honeypot was able to identify the open ports for each host
on the internal network. In fact the dynamic honeypot identified many of the same open
ports as Nmap. There are some discrepancies, which is to be expected. 192.168.2.1 is
the address of the LAN interface on the belkin router. The open ports listed by Nmap are
likely the result of the belkin’s firewall configuration, which was supposed to be
disabled, since these same open ports show up in the other hosts as well. An attempt to
actually open an ftp connection to 192.168.2.1 failed and confirmed that the belkin router
was behaving somewhat unpredictably. This did not affect the functioning of the
dynamic honeypot, in fact it could be argued that the dynamic honeypot’s passive
network analysis is more accurate than Nmap’s.
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mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
38 | 2004-09-20 15:07:04 |
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
256 | 2004-09-20 10:42:03 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 |
+--------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+--------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+--------------+------+
| 192.168.2.16 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 445 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
21 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.62 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 |
+--------------+------+
17 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Figure 5.4. Contents of the host and ports tables after
external Nmap scan.
Unfortunately the dynamic honeypot is only able to identify open ports that are
accessed across the bridge, which make it blind to strictly internal network services. In
some situations, a DMZ for example, it is desirable for the dynamic honeypot to emulate
only externally accessible services. In such cases the dynamic honeypot would be
focused specifically on external threats.
But if the dynamic honeypot is to concern itself with all services on all hosts that
are apart of the LAN, then some other solution, in place of or along side of the bridge,
must be used. Some options include using a spanning port, or resorting to using some
active, rather than passive, measures. The passive bridge approach does identify all the
hosts, and was able to fingerprint their operating systems; it is only the identification of
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open ports where it proved inadequate. Other viable and straightforward approaches
have been suggested, so this problem was not considered an impediment to continued
testing for the dynamic honeypot.
5.2

Testing Honeypot Configuration
Having established that the passive network analysis is working somewhat as

expected, and that it’s shortcomings can readily be addressed, the next step was testing
the honeypot configuration. Testing how the dynamic honeypot configures the virtual
honeypots required more than one LAN configuration. Rather than using virtual
machines, or some other modification to the LAN, different LAN configurations were
directly entered into the database. This made it possible to test several network
configurations in a relatively short amount of time.
First the actual LAN configuration, seen in the previous section, was used (some
IP addresses have changed due to a system reset). Once the database was populated,
shown in figure 5.3, and configuration was complete, the dynamic honeypot had created
four honeypot groups, one for each host. This is consistent with what would be expected,
since the total address space used by these host is only 64. For four hosts this produces
an average distance of 16 and a threshold of 12 (threshold is initially set to 75% of the
average distance). Appropriate open ports and proxies were established. The tables
pertaining to the honeypot definitions are listed in figure 5.5.
Once the dynamic honeypot filled these tables it wrote the Honeyd configuration
file based on them, and then started Honeyd. Appendix G shows the Honeyd
configuration file generated from the tables in figure 5.5. Honeyd was successfully
launched, indicating there were no syntactical errors in the configuration file.
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To carry out further tests different network configurations were manually entered
into the database, the dynamic honeypot then configured the honeypots based on these
simulated network configurations. Appendix A lists the relevant tables from the
honeypot database as well as the Honeyd configuration file for these tests. The various
configurations demonstrate the dynamic honeypot’s ability to sensibly configure
honeypots based on passive network analysis. Similar operating systems are grouped
together, but only if they are close enough in IP address space. Each test resulted in a
successful launch of Honeyd.
Tests 2 and 3 both use the same network configuration information, but use a
different percentage to determine the membership threshold. This shows the effect of
using a different percentage of the average distance for the membership threshold. The
result being that the two honeypots from test 2 (20 and 30) were combined into one
honeypot (10) in test 3, which used the same network information as test 2. The dynamic
honeypot also made appropriate choices for IP addresses of the honeypots. For example,
in test 1 the two honeypots with more than one member (20 and 30) both only have even
numbered IP addresses, consistent with the fact that the hosts in each of these groups
have even IP addresses.
5.3

Testing Virtual Honeypot Deployment
From inside the network, the Linux workstation was used to connect to various

actual hosts and their corresponding honeypots. Since the Linux workstation is on the
internal network the dynamic honeypot should proxy any honeypot connection attempts
to an actual host. For example figures 5.6 shows a screen shot of the browser connected
to the web server (192.168.2.40) and figure 5.7 shows a screen shot of the browser
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connected to the honeypot associated with the web server (192.168.2.41). Both pages are
the same, indicating the honeypot was acting as a proxy for the server, as was intended.
Similar tests were carried out using SSH, FTP, and netcat, all with similar positive
results.
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots;
+------+--------------+--------------------------------------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
| os
|
+------+--------------+--------------------------------------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.23 | Windows 2000 SP2
|
|
20 | 192.168.2.63 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
30 | 192.168.2.17 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
40 | 192.168.2.41 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
+------+--------------+--------------------------------------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts;
+------+--------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
|
+------+--------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
30 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
40 | 192.168.2.40 |
+------+--------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports;
+------+------+--------------+
| hpid | port | proxy
|
+------+------+--------------+
|
10 | 135 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 139 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 445 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 |
22 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 111 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
30 |
22 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 443 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 3306 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
40 |
21 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
40 |
22 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
40 |
80 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
40 | 111 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
40 | 443 | 192.168.2.40 |
+------+------+--------------+
17 rows in set (0.02 sec)

Figure 5.5. Contents of the honeypots, honeyhosts, and
honeyports tables as a result of configuration.
From the external network, using the Windows XP machine, the same types of
connections were made. Figure 5.6 is a screen shot of the browser connected to the
honeypot at 192.168.2.41. This time the honeypot is using the iis.sh script and not
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proxying to an internal host. As seen in figure 5.8, the script provides some degree of
realism.
Using netcat other connections were made to internal honeypots, figure 5.9 shows
some of these. The honeypots deployed by the dynamic honeypot preformed as
expected. When an internal host connected to one of the honeypot it acted as proxy for
some actual host on the internal network. When an external host connected to one of the
honeypots it functioned as port monitor, and in some cases used very simple scripts to
simulate aspects of a service.

Figure 5.6. Connection to the web server from an internal
host.
During the tests the dynamic honeypot accurately distinguished between internal
and external hosts; however, this may have been an artifact of the network configuration
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(the Windows XP system uses a wireless connection to the Linksys router). Considering
the potential risk that would result from on external host being identified by the system as
internal, extensive testing of the mechanism for distinguishing between internal and
external hosts would be needed prior to deployment on a real network.
The dynamic honeypot was deployed on a single subnet, 192.168.2.0. While test
4 in appendix A shows that the dynamic honeypot can handle configuration of multiple
subnets, it has no means of deploying virtual honeypots on another subnet. To be useful
in a production environment the dynamic honeypot will need the ability to deploy
honeypots on multiple subnets. Since multiple other subnets may use NAT, passive
network analysis may need to address this issue as well.

Figure 5.7. Connection to the honeypot web server from an
internal host.
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Another problem that was encountered was that aprd, used to attract traffic to the
honeypot can interfere with normal network traffic. The most noticeable interference
came when trying to add an additional host to the LAN. The IP address being handed out
by the DHCP server on the Belkin router was an already in use as a honeypot. Since the
DHCP server new nothing of the assigned IP address the new host was unable to connect
to the network. To overcome this problem, the dynamic honeypot had to be stopped,
allowing the system to connect, and then the dynamic honeypot was started up again.

Figure 5.8. Connection to the honeypot web server from
external host.
5.4

Testing The Intrusion Detection Abilities
With the dynamic honeypot performing as expected some preliminary testing of

the intrusion detection capabilities of the system were carried out. Recall that Snort was
deployed to monitor the honeypot interface, and configured to alert on any established
TCP connection flowing to the server, as well as when any of its standard rules are
triggered. ACID was configured to provide a GUI to the alerts generated by Snort, which
are stored in a MySQL database. Any alerts generated from the previous testing were
deleted; figure 5.10 shows the main ACID console with no alerts.
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Figure 5.9. Connection to various honeypot services from
external host.

Figure 5.10. ACID console for the honeypots prior to any
activity.
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In addition to the Snort sensor deployed on the dynamic honeypot interface, a
Snort sensor was also deployed on the bridge, using only the default rule set. The bridge
sensor was a precautionary measure for times when the LAN was exposed to the Internet,
and also served as a comparison for some of the results of the dynamic honeypot
intrusion detection system.
5.4.1

Controlled Intrusions
Since the dynamic honeypot treats internal and external hosts differently, a set of

preliminary tests from both the internal and external network was conducted. These
consisted of simple interactions, designed to demonstrate what alarms might look like.
The tests consisted of using Nmap to scan the 192.168.2.0/24 subnet on port 80 only and
connecting to the actual web server and the honeypot web server. In addition to these
tests an actual exploit against the Windows 2000 desktop and its associated honeypot was
launched, and a backdoor was installed on the Windows 2000 desktop using netcat.
Figure 5.11 shows the ACID listing of all the alerts generated during the tests1.
The ICMP PING NMAP alerts come from the default Snort rules, and are consistent with
the fact that NMAP was used against the network. The honeypot traffic alerts are
generated by the rule that was added to implement anomaly detection using the dynamic
honeypots. These alerts were expected as a result of the tests, and there presence
indicates that the intrusion detection alert mechanism was operating correctly.
Alerts 4 through 9 were generated when the Windows XP system (on the external
network at 192.168.1.100) connected to one of the honeypots (192.168.2.41) with port 80
open. Using ACID it is possible to view the individual packet that caused the alert,
1

2 ICMP alerts and one honeypot traffic alert were deleted so that all the alerts would fit on the screen at
one time
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simply by clicking on the ID for that packet. This feature of ACID will make using the
output of the dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system easy to use for incidence
response. Figure 5.12 shows the result of clicking on ID #8-(5-369).
Alerts 25, 26, and 27 pertain to the exploit that was launched, first against the
honeypot, and then successively against the actual Windows 2000 host. By examining
the packets that caused the alert, at least part of the actual exploit code can be seen.
Interestingly Snort did not generate any other alerts, which means had this attack been
against an actual host, Snort would not have detected it. In fact, the bridge Snort sensor
failed to generate any alarm related to the exploit. Figure 5.13 shows the packet from
alert number 26, with the exploit payload.

Figure 5.11. ACID listing of alerts after initial test traffic.
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To simulate some worm activity, the exploit2 was systematically launched from
Linux workstation on the internal network against all hosts on the internal network.
Similar alerts were observed, but this time one of Snorts default rules, NETBIOS
DCERPC IsystemActivator bind attempt, did fire when the exploit was launched against
the honeypot with port 135 (the attack port) open. The “honeypot traffic” rule also fired.
In this case the dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system detected and generated an
alert as a result of an actual exploit attempt against one of its honeypots.

Figure 5.12. ACID view of an individual packet that
caused an alert.
These initial tests show the potential for intrusion detection using a dynamic
honeypot. Initially non-malicious traffic was used to observe how the dynamic honeypot

2

This exploit was used by the original Blaster worm.
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intrusion detection system would respond to anomalous traffic. All of the anomalous
traffic generated an alert. A known exploit attempt launched from the external network
against a honeypot generated an alert, while no alert was generated by the conventional
intrusion detection system deployed on bridge.

Figure 5.13. ACID view of an exploit packet.
An interesting result came from re-examining the honeypot definitions after the
tests had been conducted. As a result of periodic updating, the dynamic honeypot
reconfigures its honeypots. The new configuration, listed in appendix B, reflected the
open ports created by the attack. One of the honeypots now had port 666 and 17666
open. 666 was the port of the bindshell created by the attack, and 17666 was the port on
which the backdoor was listening.
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5.4.2

Real World intrusions
The next round of testing involved exposing parts of the network to the Internet

and potential real attacks. This was done in two phases, the first phase exposed some of
the honeypots to potential attacks, and the second phase exposed an actual system. Both
tests are in a sense a simulation of a mis-configured firewall. Since the ISP was only
providing one IP address it was necessary to use NAT on both routers. This required a
slight configuration change, but one that is essentially invisible to the dynamic honeypot.
The first test forwarded some traffic from the Internet to three of the honeypots.
Web and FTP requests will be forwarded to 192.168.2.41, which is the honeypot
associated with the Server. Requests on ports 135 and 139, NET BIOS, were forwarded
to 192.168.2.47, the honeypot associated with the Windows 2000 desktop. Finally, any
requests on port 3306, MySQL, were forwarded to 192.168.2.63, the honeypot associated
with the Linux workstation. The test was run for 12 hours, between 10 am. and 10 pm.
on September 23.
A total 492 alerts were generated, all on port 80. Figure 5.14 shows the ACID
home page at the conclusion of the test. There were 7 unique alerts, all from the same
source. Figure 5.15 is a listing from ACID of each unique alert. The majority of the
alerts, 351, were generated by the custom honeypot traffic alert rule, the rest are from the
Snort’s default rule set. All of the attacks came from the same source, between 10:30 and
11:15. The attacks largely consisted of directory traversal attempts and cmd.exe
attempts. None of the alerts were generated by legitimate traffic, anecdotal evidence of a
low false positive rate.
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Figure 5.14. ACID console after some external traffic is
allowed to reach the honeypots.
The second test involved exposing some of the actual systems to the Internet.
Since the Windows 2000 Desktop had already been shown to have at least one
vulnerability, it was placed on a DMZ, removing any firewall or NAT protection. The
test was carried out for three days. While there was interaction with the Windows
system, mostly on the UDP messenger service, no successful attacks were launched
against it. It was not possible therefore, to test the intrusion detection abilities of the
dynamic honeypot with this test.
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exposing the honeypot to the Internet.

76

.

CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
6.1

Conclusions
Computers and networks are becoming a more central part of our everyday lives,

they providing us with the convenience of e-commerce and e-banking, and the necessities
of electricity and water. In response to this growing dependence are both the difficulty
and the need for better computer security. Good security is best achieved through a
combination of security technologies, policies and procedures. Today firewalls and antivirus software are an absolute necessity and intrusion detection systems are becoming
more predominant. It is almost certain that good computer security in the future will rely
on an ever-increasing variety of security technologies that will include new types of
intrusion detection systems.
In this thesis a novel type of intrusion detection system, based on a dynamic
honeypot, was explored. The dynamic honeypot is a plug and play honeypot solution that
eliminates the need for time consuming configuration and maintenance. Once deployed
on a network, an intrusion detection system can be set up by monitoring traffic to the
honeypot. The intrusion detection system implements anomaly detection since all traffic
to a honeypot is anomalous. Moreover, since the dynamic honeypot requires little
configuration or supervision, neither does intrusion detection.
The dynamic honeypot implementation was successful in deciding how many
honeypots to deploy, what they should look like, and where they should be deployed. It
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was discovered that while passive network analysis is effective for identifying hosts on a
network, it was not as effective at identifying the open ports associated with those hosts.
Using virtual honeypot technology, the dynamic honeypot was able to deploy the
honeypots once they were configured. Once deployed, alerts generated by the dynamic
honeypot intrusion detection system were indeed some type of anomaly. Therefore the
dynamic honeypot did appropriately identify intrusive behavior, even if that behavior did
not always take the form of an exploit, exploit attempt, or attack.
Using a dynamic honeypot for intrusion detection and network monitoring was
never intended to replace existing intrusion detection systems. Instead it was designed to
supplement these and other security systems. Therefore it is not necessary that it identify
every intrusion, which it did not, only that it identifies some intrusions that might not be
identified by other security systems, which it did.
Discerning the meaning or significance of the alerts generated by the dynamic
honeypot intrusion detection system is left up to the system administrator. For example,
if a connection is made to a honeypot web server from an internal host, the dynamic
honeypot intrusion detection system, via the ACID console, will report this with one or
more alerts. From the alert the administrator will immediately know the source IP
address of the anomaly. By clicking on the appropriate link she can also see the packet
that caused the alert. In addition there may be other alerts from Snort’s rule set indicating
that the packet matches one of its signatures. From the contents of the packet or a Snort
alert, the administrator begins the process of deciding whether this is some employee,
maliciously or benignly poking around the network; or whether an internal host has been
compromised in some way.
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The system has other potential uses beyond the obvious network monitoring
capability. A dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system might be used in the area of
risk assessment. The passive network analysis component alone can be useful in this
area. It automatically provides a detailed listing of the hosts on the network and which
ports are open. An automated and independent source of this information, such as the
dynamic honeypot with an added GUI that presents the up to date passive network
analysis results, would be valuable in verifying what network administrators claim to be
their network and host configurations. In addition, the alert mechanism could provide to
those carrying out risk analysis clandestine information about potential holes in the
perimeter defenses and insider threats.
Another very interesting potential use could be for the collection of forensic data.
A dynamic honeypot could be placed on an organizations network, and configured such
that its logs, etc., meet all legal requirement for admissible evidence. In addition those
logs, etc., could be structured such that finding relevant forensic data was very
straightforward. If a serious security event occurred it would (hopefully) include
interaction with a honeypot. In such situation evidence would quickly and readily be
available, and have very little recovery cost. In addition, assuming there was sufficient
evidence, the IT department could focus on repairing any damage without being
concerned over destroying evidence.
6.2

Directions For Future Research
Because it has the ability to detect previously unknown attacks, anomaly based

intrusion detection is highly desirable. However it is proving difficult to effectively
implement. While the dynamic honeypot based intrusion detection system described in
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this thesis does not provide network wide, comprehensive intrusion detection, it does
provide anomaly based intrusion detection. Rather than simply reporting any traffic to
the honeypot as an intrusion, intelligent data analysis techniques could be applied to the
anomalous traffic. This idea was proposed earlier, but not explored, and is an avenue of
future research with great possibilities.
There are several directions such research might take. The simplest direction,
mentioned previously, would be to develop a set of rules that could be applied to the
captured honeypot traffic. This approach could be a real-time system, where the rules
processed honeypot traffic as it was captured and generated an ongoing report. Or a
collection of honeypot traffic could be analyzed, after it was captured, generating a static
periodic report. In either case the rules would provide high-level threat evaluation data,
and make recommendations for incidence response.
Another avenue of exploration is the development of a system that analyzes the
captured honeypot traffic in an attempt to write detection rules for a conventional
intrusion detection system. For example, say Snort is deployed as a NIDS, and then a
dynamic honeypot intrusion detection system deployment captures traffic to the
honeypot, analyzes it, and generates additional detection rules for Snort. These rules
could be automatically added the running NIDS. This could potentially create a selflearning comprehensive intrusion detection system.
Another potential direction for further research would be to explore combining
the honeypot configurations, the hosts, which host are associated with which honeypot,
and the honeypot traffic into a comprehensive graphical reporting mechanism. As was
shown in one of the tests, passive network analysis picked up on the bindshell and
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backdoor created by the RPCDOM exploit. Having this information in an easy to read
and understand format that shows all the relevant associations could provide valuable
information to a network administrator, especially for a large network.
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Appendix A
The contents of several tables in the honeypot database indicating various
network configurations, and the honeyd configuration file generated by the dynamic
honeypot for that network configuration. The membership threshold used to determine
host groupings is stated for each test as a percentage of the average distance between the
hosts.
Test 1, using 75% of average distance for the threshold:
Honeypot database tables:
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+---------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+---------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
43 | 2004-09-21 11:14:37 |
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 |
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2
|
25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 |
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2
|
23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 |
+---------------+-------------------+-------+---------------------+
6 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+---------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+---------------+------+
| 192.168.2.16 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 445 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 1414 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
21 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.62 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.200 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.202 | 443 |
+---------------+------+
26 rows in set (0.02 sec)
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mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts;
+------+---------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
|
+------+---------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
30 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
40 | 192.168.2.200 |
|
40 | 192.168.2.202 |
+------+---------------+
6 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots;
+------+---------------+------------------------------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
| os
|
+------+---------------+------------------------------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.23 | Windows 2000 SP2
|
|
20 | 192.168.2.32 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
30 | 192.168.2.17 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
40 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/* |
+------+---------------+------------------------------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports;
+------+------+---------------+
| hpid | port | proxy
|
+------+------+---------------+
|
10 | 135 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 139 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 445 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 |
21 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 |
22 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 |
80 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 | 111 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 443 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
30 |
22 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 443 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 3306 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
40 |
22 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
40 |
80 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
40 | 443 | 192.168.2.202 |
+------+------+---------------+
18 rows in set (0.00 sec)

Honeyd configuration file used by the dynamic honeypot.
create default
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98"
set default default tcp action block
set default default udp action block
set default default icmp action block
create honeypot10intern
set honeypot10intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2"
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block
set honeypot10intern default udp action block
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open
add honeypot10intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135
add honeypot10intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139
add honeypot10intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025
create honeypot10extern
set honeypot10extern personality "Windows 2000 SP2"
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block
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set honeypot10extern default udp action block
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 135 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 139 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 445 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1025 open
dynamic honeypot10
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot10
create honeypot20intern
set honeypot20intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21
add honeypot20intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22
add honeypot20intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80
add honeypot20intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111
add honeypot20intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443
add honeypot20intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306
add honeypot20intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000
create honeypot20extern
set honeypot20extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 6000 open
dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.32 honeypot20
create honeypot30intern
set honeypot30intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block
set honeypot30intern default udp action block
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443
add honeypot30intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241
add honeypot30intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306
create honeypot30extern
set honeypot30extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block
set honeypot30extern default udp action block
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 1241 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
dynamic honeypot30
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot30
create honeypot40intern
set honeypot40intern personality "AIX 4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block
set honeypot40intern default udp action block
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open
create honeypot40extern
set honeypot40extern personality "AIX 4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block
set honeypot40extern default udp action block
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open
dynamic honeypot40
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add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern
bind 192.168.2.201 honeypot40

Test 2, using 75% of average distance for threshold:
Honeypot database tables:
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
43 | 2004-09-21 11:14:37 |
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 |
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2
|
25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 |
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2
|
23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 |
| 192.168.2.23 | Windows XP Pro SP1 |
22 | 2004-09-21 12:40:18 |
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
7 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+---------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+---------------+------+
| 192.168.2.16 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 445 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 1414 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
21 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.62 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.200 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.202 | 443 |
+---------------+------+
26 rows in set (0.01 sec)
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts;
+------+---------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
|
+------+---------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
30 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
40 | 192.168.2.200 |
|
40 | 192.168.2.202 |
+------+---------------+
7 rows in set (0.00 sec)
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mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots;
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
| os
|
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.20 | Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release |
|
20 | 192.168.2.32 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
30 | 192.168.2.17 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
40 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*
|
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports;
+------+------+---------------+
| hpid | port | proxy
|
+------+------+---------------+
|
10 | 135 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
10 | 139 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
10 | 445 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
10 | 1414 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
20 |
21 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 |
22 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 |
80 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 | 111 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 443 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
20 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
30 |
22 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 443 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
30 | 3306 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
40 |
22 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
40 |
80 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
40 | 443 | 192.168.2.202 |
+------+------+---------------+
19 rows in set (0.01 sec)

Honeyd configuration file used by the dynamic honeypot
create default
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98"
set default default tcp action block
set default default udp action block
set default default icmp action block
create honeypot10intern
set honeypot10intern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release"
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block
set honeypot10intern default udp action block
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open
add honeypot10intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.23:135
add honeypot10intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.23:139
add honeypot10intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1414 proxy 192.168.2.23:1414
create honeypot10extern
set honeypot10extern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release"
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block
set honeypot10extern default udp action block
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 135 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 139 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 445 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1025 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1414 open
dynamic honeypot10
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern
bind 192.168.2.20 honeypot10
create honeypot20intern
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set honeypot20intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21
add honeypot20intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22
add honeypot20intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80
add honeypot20intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111
add honeypot20intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443
add honeypot20intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306
add honeypot20intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000
create honeypot20extern
set honeypot20extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 6000 open
dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.32 honeypot20
create honeypot30intern
set honeypot30intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block
set honeypot30intern default udp action block
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443
add honeypot30intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241
add honeypot30intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306
create honeypot30extern
set honeypot30extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block
set honeypot30extern default udp action block
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 1241 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
dynamic honeypot30
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot30
create honeypot40intern
set honeypot40intern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block
set honeypot40intern default udp action block
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open
add honeypot40intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.202:22
add honeypot40intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.202:80
add honeypot40intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.202:443
create honeypot40extern
set honeypot40extern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block
set honeypot40extern default udp action block
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open
add honeypot40extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot40extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot40extern tcp port 443 open
dynamic honeypot40
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern
bind 192.168.2.194 honeypot40
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Test 3 using 99% of average distance for threshold:
Honeypot database tables:
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
44 | 2004-09-21 13:14:40 |
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 |
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2
|
25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 |
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2
|
23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 |
| 192.168.2.23 | Windows XP Pro SP1 |
22 | 2004-09-21 12:40:18 |
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
7 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+---------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+---------------+------+
| 192.168.2.16 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 445 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 1414 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
21 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.62 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.200 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.202 | 443 |
+---------------+------+
26 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts;
+------+---------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
|
+------+---------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
10 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
10 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
30 | 192.168.2.200 |
|
30 | 192.168.2.202 |
+------+---------------+
7 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots;
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
| os
|
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
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|
10 | 192.168.2.46 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
20 | 192.168.2.21 | Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release |
|
30 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*
|
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
3 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports;
+------+------+---------------+
| hpid | port | proxy
|
+------+------+---------------+
|
10 |
22 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
10 | 443 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
10 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
10 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
10 |
21 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
10 |
80 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
10 | 111 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
10 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 135 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
20 | 139 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
20 | 445 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 1414 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
30 |
22 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
30 |
80 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
30 | 443 | 192.168.2.202 |
+------+------+---------------+
16 rows in set (0.01 sec)

Honeyd configuration file used by the dynamic honeypot.
create default
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98"
set default default tcp action block
set default default udp action block
set default default icmp action block
create honeypot10intern
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block
set honeypot10intern default udp action block
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open
add honeypot10intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22
add honeypot10intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80
add honeypot10intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306
add honeypot10intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000
create honeypot10extern
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block
set honeypot10extern default udp action block
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 6000 open
dynamic honeypot10
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern
bind 192.168.2.46 honeypot10
create honeypot20intern
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
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set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.23:135
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.23:139
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1414 proxy 192.168.2.23:1414
create honeypot20extern
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release"
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1414 open
dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.21 honeypot20
create honeypot30intern
set honeypot30intern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block
set honeypot30intern default udp action block
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.202:22
add honeypot30intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.202:80
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.202:443
create honeypot30extern
set honeypot30extern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block
set honeypot30extern default udp action block
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open
dynamic honeypot30
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/24
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern
bind 192.168.2.194 honeypot30

Test 4, using 75% of the average distance as the threshold:
Honeypot database tables:
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os,count,last from host;
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
| ipaddr
| os
| count | last
|
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
| 192.168.2.22 | Windows 2000 SP2+ |
3 | 2004-09-19 17:57:25 |
| 192.168.2.62 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
44 | 2004-09-21 13:14:40 |
| 192.168.2.16 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
282 | 2004-09-21 11:15:27 |
| 192.168.2.40 | Linux 2.4/2.6
|
5 | 2004-09-20 08:44:56 |
| 192.168.2.202 | AIX 4.3.2
|
25 | 2004-09-21 12:05:23 |
| 192.168.2.200 | AIX 4.3.3-5.2
|
23 | 2004-09-21 11:56:23 |
| 192.168.2.23 | Windows XP Pro SP1 |
22 | 2004-09-21 12:40:18 |
| 192.168.3.100 | OpenBSD 3.3-3.4
|
22 | 2004-09-21 13:39:18 |
| 192.168.3.102 | OpenBSD 3.3-3.4
|
22 | 2004-09-21 13:39:28 |
| 192.168.3.104 | OpenBSD 3.3-3.4
|
22 | 2004-09-21 13:39:32 |
+---------------+--------------------+-------+---------------------+
10 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,port from ports;
+---------------+------+
| ipaddr
| port |
+---------------+------+
| 192.168.2.16 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 443 |
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| 192.168.2.16 | 1241 |
| 192.168.2.16 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 445 |
| 192.168.2.22 | 1025 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 135 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 139 |
| 192.168.2.23 | 1414 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
21 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.40 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.40 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.62 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 111 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 3306 |
| 192.168.2.62 | 6000 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.200 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.200 | 443 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
22 |
| 192.168.2.202 |
80 |
| 192.168.2.202 | 443 |
| 192.168.3.100 |
21 |
| 192.168.3.100 |
80 |
| 192.168.3.102 |
21 |
| 192.168.3.102 |
80 |
| 192.168.3.104 |
21 |
| 192.168.3.104 |
80 |
+---------------+------+
32 rows in set (0.01 sec)
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr from honeyhosts;
+------+---------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
|
+------+---------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
10 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
10 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
30 | 192.168.2.200 |
|
30 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
40 | 192.168.3.100 |
|
40 | 192.168.3.102 |
|
40 | 192.168.3.104 |
+------+---------------+
10 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,inet_NTOA(ipaddr) as ipaddr,os from honeypots;
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
| hpid | ipaddr
| os
|
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
|
10 | 192.168.2.46 | Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18
|
|
20 | 192.168.2.21 | Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release |
|
30 | 192.168.2.194 | AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*
|
|
40 | 192.168.3.108 | OpenBSD 3.0 (x86 or SPARC)
|
+------+---------------+----------------------------------------------------+
4 rows in set (0.00 sec)
mysql> select hpid,port,proxy from honeyports;
+------+------+---------------+
| hpid | port | proxy
|
+------+------+---------------+
|
10 |
22 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
10 | 443 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
10 | 1241 | 192.168.2.16 |
|
10 | 3306 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
10 |
21 | 192.168.2.40 |
|
10 |
80 | 192.168.2.40 |
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|
10 | 111 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
10 | 6000 | 192.168.2.62 |
|
20 | 135 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
20 | 139 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
20 | 445 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 1025 | 192.168.2.22 |
|
20 | 1414 | 192.168.2.23 |
|
30 |
22 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
30 |
80 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
30 | 443 | 192.168.2.202 |
|
40 |
21 | 192.168.3.104 |
|
40 |
80 | 192.168.3.104 |
+------+------+---------------+
18 rows in set (0.01 sec)

Honeyd configuration file used by the dynamic honeypot.
mysql> notee
create default
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98"
set default default tcp action block
set default default udp action block
set default default icmp action block
create honeypot10intern
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block
set honeypot10intern default udp action block
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open
add honeypot10intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22
add honeypot10intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80
add honeypot10intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306
add honeypot10intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000
create honeypot10extern
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block
set honeypot10extern default udp action block
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 6000 open
dynamic honeypot10
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern
bind 192.168.2.46 honeypot10
create honeypot20intern
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.23:135
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.23:139
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1414 proxy 192.168.2.23:1414
create honeypot20extern
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows XP Professional RC1+ through final release"
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open
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add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1414 open
dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.21 honeypot20
create honeypot30intern
set honeypot30intern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block
set honeypot30intern default udp action block
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.202:22
add honeypot30intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.202:80
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.202:443
create honeypot30extern
set honeypot30extern personality "AIX 4.3.2.0-4.3.3.0 on an IBM RS/*"
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block
set honeypot30extern default udp action block
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open
dynamic honeypot30
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern
bind 192.168.2.194 honeypot30
create honeypot40intern
set honeypot40intern personality "OpenBSD 3.0 (x86 or SPARC)"
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block
set honeypot40intern default udp action block
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open
add honeypot40intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.3.104:21
add honeypot40intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.3.104:80
create honeypot40extern
set honeypot40extern personality "OpenBSD 3.0 (x86 or SPARC)"
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block
set honeypot40extern default udp action block
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open
add honeypot40extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot40extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
dynamic honeypot40
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/23
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern
bind 192.168.3.108 honeypot40
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Appendix B
A honeyd configuration file generated during testing.
create default
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98"
set default default tcp action block
set default default udp action block
set default default icmp action block
create honeypot10intern
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block
set honeypot10intern default udp action block
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22
add honeypot10intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.16:111
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306
add honeypot10intern tcp port 32767 proxy 192.168.2.16:32767
create honeypot10extern
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block
set honeypot10extern default udp action block
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 32767 open
dynamic honeypot10
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot10
create honeypot20intern
set honeypot20intern personality "Linux 1.0.9"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21
add honeypot20intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.40:22
add honeypot20intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80
add honeypot20intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.40:111
add honeypot20intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443
add honeypot20intern tcp port 28839 proxy 192.168.2.40:28839
add honeypot20intern tcp port 32767 proxy 192.168.2.40:32767
create honeypot20extern
set honeypot20extern personality "Linux 1.0.9"
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot20extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 28839 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 32767 open
dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.41 honeypot20
create honeypot30intern
set honeypot30intern personality "Windows 2000 Professional"
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block
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set honeypot30intern default udp action block
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open
add honeypot30intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.46:135
add honeypot30intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.46:139
add honeypot30intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.46:445
add honeypot30intern tcp port 666 proxy 192.168.2.46:666
add honeypot30intern tcp port 667 proxy 192.168.2.46:667
add honeypot30intern tcp port 700 proxy 192.168.2.46:700
add honeypot30intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.46:1025
add honeypot30intern tcp port 17666 proxy 192.168.2.46:17666
create honeypot30extern
set honeypot30extern personality "Windows 2000 Professional"
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block
set honeypot30extern default udp action block
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 135 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 139 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 445 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 666 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 667 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 700 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 1025 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 17666 open
dynamic honeypot30
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern
bind 192.168.2.47 honeypot30
create honeypot40intern
set honeypot40intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block
set honeypot40intern default udp action block
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open
add honeypot40intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22
add honeypot40intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111
add honeypot40intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306
add honeypot40intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000
create honeypot40extern
set honeypot40extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block
set honeypot40extern default udp action block
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open
add honeypot40extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot40extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot40extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot40extern tcp port 6000 open
dynamic honeypot40
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern
bind 192.168.2.63 honeypot40
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Appendix C
This appendix contains the dynamic honeypot configuration rules.
There will be four steps to configuring the honeypots and a database to hold
information about the each host: its IP-address, its operating-system, and its open-ports.
There is also a table in the database to associate hosts with groups. Each group will
become one honeypot and has an operating-system-fingerprint, an IP-address, and a set of
open-ports. The database also contains a list of all valid values for the operating-systemfingerprint. There is a comparison function called similar, that compares two hosts and
returns true if they are similar to one another. It is based on the IP-address and the
operating-system of each host. There is another comparison function called like, the
compares an operating-system and an operating-system-fingerprint, and returns true if
they are alike. It is based on simple string comparison.
Rules are listed in order of priority, meaning that the rule that appears earliest in
the list has the highest priority. The rule with highest priority is the rule to be applied. In
cases where the one rule’s conditions are a superset of another’s, the rule whose
conditions are the super set will be used. Initially there are no groups, and the step is
group-hosts.
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Rules
1.1

If

1.2

Then
If

1.3
2.1

2.2
3.1

3.2
4.1

4.2

then
If
Then
If

Then
If
Then
If

Then
If
Then
If
Then
If
Then

the step is group-host
there is a host, A, that is not a member of a group
there is a host, B, that is a member of group, X
A is similar to B.
A is a member of group X
the step is group-host
there is a host, A, that is not a member of a group.
create a new group Y, A is a member of group Y.
the step is group-host
step is select-os.
the step is select-os
group X does not have an operating-system-fingerprint
M is a valid operating-system-fingerprint
host A is in group X
the operating-system of A is like M
the operating-system-fingerprint of X is M
the step is select-os
the step is select-ip
the step is select-ip
group X does not have an IP-address
host A is a member of group X
Q is the IP-address of A with one bit changed
Q is not an IP address of any host
Q is not an IP-address of any group
the IP-address of group X is Q
the step is select-ip
the step is select-ports
the step is select-ports
group X does not have any open-ports
P is all open-ports of any host that is a member of group X
the open-ports of group X is P
the step is select-ports
stop
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Appendix D
Possible alarm rules for the dynamic honeypot based intrusion detection system.
Operation:
A sensor will capture all traffic to the dynamic honeypots, and each packet to a
honeypot will be considered an anomalous event. Each event will have a source,
destination, etc. All events will be stored in a database. The following rules will operate
on a subset of these events, called the active_events. Active_events are all events that
have occurred since a specified period of time in the past, i.e.: active_events are all
events that have occurred in the last 24 hours. The current_event is the event most
recently generated.
Rules:
Basic Rules or transaction level rules:
#1.1
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events, then generate a
high number of anomalies alarm (“There has been a significant increase in the traffic to
your honeypots”).
#1.2
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events, and one source is
associated with more than X% of all active_events then generate a high traffic one source
alarm (“there has been a significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots, the majority
of which originated with <src>”).
#1.3
If the total number of active-events exceeds the threshold max_events, and one
destination address is more than X% of all events then generate high traffic one
destination alarm (“there has been a significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots,
Y% of which has been with <dst>”).
#1.4
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events and one dest port
is more than X% of all events then generate high traffic single port alarm(“there has been
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significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots, Y% of which was directed at port
<des port>, potentially scanning for a new vulnerability”).
#1.5
If the total number of active_events exceeds the threshold max_events and one source is
associated with more then X% of all active_events and one destination is associated with
more than XX % of all active_events generate high traffic persistent attacker alarm
(“there has been significant increase in the traffic to your honeypots, Y% of which came
from <src> and YY% went to <dest>”).
#1.6
If any active_event is from the external network then generate perimeter penetration
alarm (“Packet(s) from the external network <net_id> have reached a honeypot: <list of
relevant events>”). (**depending on the network architecture and firewall rules, this rule
might not apply and can be disabled)
#1.7
If the total number of active_events having the same source is greater than X, and the
percent of these with the same destination port is greater than Y then generate scanning
for vulnerability alarm (“Source <src> appears to be scanning for a specific vulnerability
on port <dest port>, <list relevant events>”).
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Session rules:
Trigger:
If current_event is part of a legitimate session (currently only TCP) and this is the last
packet in the session, or penultimate packet in the session, then extract the entire session
stream, remember the source and destination, check against rules (yields alerts), calculate
bytes/packet, and activate session rules.
Check against rules: Run only this session through a signature based IDS and capture the
output as alerts. If such an IDS is deployed on the network use the same rules.
Calculate bytes/packet: Calculate the total number of bytes transmitted, and the total
number of packets used to transmit that data, and determine the bytes/packet (possible
fragmentation).
#2.1
IF alerts != null then generate known threat detected alarm (“the following session
occurred between source and destination at <time>. One or more potential threats was
identified <print alarms> <print session>”).
#2.2
IF alerts != null and bytes/packet is < X then generate known exploit and tcp
fragmentation detected alarm (“The following session between src and dest occurred at
<time>. The bytes transmitted per package was unusually low (<val>), and one or more
potential threats was identified. <print alarms> <print session>”).
#2.3
IF session port = http and alerts == null and URI != / , /index.htm, …etc., then generate
suspicious http session alarm (“the following http session occurred between <src> and
<dest> at <time>. It is not a normally recognized convention, but failed to sound any
defined IDS alarms.”).
#2.4
IF alerts == null then generate supicious session alarm (“the following session occurred
between <src> and one of your honeypots (<dest>) at <time>. It failed to trigger any
defined IDS alarms.”).
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Appendix E
Output of nmap scan of the network, prior to honeypot deployment. The scan is
preformed from outside the network.
Nmap –sT –e eth0 192.168.2.0/24 –F
Starting nmap 3.50 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap/ ) at 2004-09-20 11:56 EDT
Host 192.168.2.0 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 3 extra pings).
Skipping host.
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.1:
(The 1214 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
53/tcp closed domain
80/tcp open
http
515/tcp open
printer
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.16:
(The 1213 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
22/tcp
open ssh
443/tcp open https
1241/tcp open nessus
3306/tcp open mysql
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.22:
(The 1213 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
135/tcp open msrpc
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
445/tcp open microsoft-ds
1025/tcp open NFS-or-IIS
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.40:
(The 1212 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
21/tcp open ftp
22/tcp open ssh
80/tcp open http
111/tcp open rpcbind
443/tcp open https
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.62:
(The 1213 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: closed)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
22/tcp
open ssh
111/tcp open rpcbind
3306/tcp open mysql
6000/tcp open X11
Host 192.168.2.255 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 3 extra pings).
Skipping host.
Nmap run completed -- 256 IP addresses (5 hosts up) scanned in 60.636 seconds
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Appendix F
Results of an nmap scan of the network, preformed from outside the network.
Nmap –sT 192.168.2.0/24 –F
Starting nmap 3.50 ( http://www.insecure.org/nmap ) at 2004-09-20 16:20 Eastern Standard
Time
Host 192.168.2.0 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 1 extra pings).
Skipping host.
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.1:
(The 1210 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
21/tcp
open ftp
25/tcp
open smtp
110/tcp open pop3
389/tcp open ldap
515/tcp open printer
1002/tcp open windows-icfw
1720/tcp open H.323/Q.931
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.16:
(The 1209 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
21/tcp
open ftp
22/tcp
open ssh
25/tcp
open smtp
110/tcp open pop3
389/tcp open ldap
1002/tcp open windows-icfw
1241/tcp open nessus
1720/tcp open H.323/Q.931
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.22:
(The 1210 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
21/tcp
open ftp
25/tcp
open smtp
110/tcp open pop3
139/tcp open netbios-ssn
389/tcp open ldap
1002/tcp open windows-icfw
1720/tcp open H.323/Q.931
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.40:
(The 1208 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
21/tcp
open ftp
22/tcp
open ssh
25/tcp
open smtp
80/tcp
open http
110/tcp open pop3
389/tcp open ldap
443/tcp open https
1002/tcp open windows-icfw
1720/tcp open H.323/Q.931
Interesting ports on 192.168.2.62:
(The 1209 ports scanned but not shown below are in state: filtered)
PORT
STATE SERVICE
21/tcp
open ftp
22/tcp
open ssh
25/tcp
open smtp
110/tcp open pop3
111/tcp open rpcbind
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389/tcp open
1002/tcp open
1720/tcp open

ldap
windows-icfw
H.323/Q.931

Host 192.168.2.255 seems to be a subnet broadcast address (returned 3 extra pings).
Skipping host.
Nmap run completed -- 256 IP addresses (5 hosts up) scanned in 2141.656 seconds Nmap run
completed -- 256 IP addresses (4 hosts up) scanned in 1667.297 seconds
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Appendix G
Initial honeyd configuration file generated by the dynamic honeypot.
create default
set default personality "Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98"
set default default tcp action block
set default default udp action block
set default default icmp action block
create honeypot10intern
set honeypot10intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10intern default tcp action block
set honeypot10intern default udp action block
set honeypot10intern default icmp action open
add honeypot10intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.16:22
add honeypot10intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.16:443
add honeypot10intern tcp port 1241 proxy 192.168.2.16:1241
add honeypot10intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.16:3306
create honeypot10extern
set honeypot10extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot10extern default tcp action block
set honeypot10extern default udp action block
set honeypot10extern default icmp action open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot10extern tcp port 443 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 1241 open
add honeypot10extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
dynamic honeypot10
add honeypot10 use honeypot10intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot10 otherwise use honeypot10extern
bind 192.168.2.17 honeypot10
create honeypot20intern
set honeypot20intern personality "Windows 2000 SP2"
set honeypot20intern default tcp action block
set honeypot20intern default udp action block
set honeypot20intern default icmp action open
add honeypot20intern tcp port 135 proxy 192.168.2.22:135
add honeypot20intern tcp port 139 proxy 192.168.2.22:139
add honeypot20intern tcp port 445 proxy 192.168.2.22:445
add honeypot20intern tcp port 1025 proxy 192.168.2.22:1025
create honeypot20extern
set honeypot20extern personality "Windows 2000 SP2"
set honeypot20extern default tcp action block
set honeypot20extern default udp action block
set honeypot20extern default icmp action open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 135 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 139 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 445 open
add honeypot20extern tcp port 1025 open
dynamic honeypot20
add honeypot20 use honeypot20intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot20 otherwise use honeypot20extern
bind 192.168.2.23 honeypot20
create honeypot30intern
set honeypot30intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot30intern default tcp action block
set honeypot30intern default udp action block
set honeypot30intern default icmp action open
add honeypot30intern tcp port 21 proxy 192.168.2.40:21
add honeypot30intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.40:22
add honeypot30intern tcp port 80 proxy 192.168.2.40:80
add honeypot30intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.40:111
add honeypot30intern tcp port 443 proxy 192.168.2.40:443
create honeypot30extern
set honeypot30extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot30extern default tcp action block
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set honeypot30extern default udp action block
set honeypot30extern default icmp action open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 21 "./scripts/ftp.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 80 "./scripts/iis.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot30extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot30extern tcp port 443 open
dynamic honeypot30
add honeypot30 use honeypot30intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot30 otherwise use honeypot30extern
bind 192.168.2.41 honeypot30
create honeypot40intern
set honeypot40intern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot40intern default tcp action block
set honeypot40intern default udp action block
set honeypot40intern default icmp action open
add honeypot40intern tcp port 22 proxy 192.168.2.62:22
add honeypot40intern tcp port 111 proxy 192.168.2.62:111
add honeypot40intern tcp port 3306 proxy 192.168.2.62:3306
add honeypot40intern tcp port 6000 proxy 192.168.2.62:6000
create honeypot40extern
set honeypot40extern personality "Linux 2.4.16 - 2.4.18"
set honeypot40extern default tcp action block
set honeypot40extern default udp action block
set honeypot40extern default icmp action open
add honeypot40extern tcp port 22 "./scripts/ssh.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot40extern tcp port 111 open
add honeypot40extern tcp port 3306 "./scripts/mysql.sh $ipsrc $sport"
add honeypot40extern tcp port 6000 open
dynamic honeypot40
add honeypot40 use honeypot40intern if source ip = 192.168.2.0/26
add honeypot40 otherwise use honeypot40extern
bind 192.168.2.63 honeypot40
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Appendix H
Source Code listings
#include<cstdlib>
#include<iostream>
#include</usr/include/mysql/mysql.h>
#ifndef DBIF
#include"datetime.h"
/*
dbif.h
written by Jeff Hieb, July 2004
This is the class definition for the class dbif
class dbif is a database interface class for
a MySQL database.
*/
class dbif {
MYSQL *mysql; //data base handle
MYSQL_RES *result;//stores query results
public:
unsigned int num_rows;//number of rows in result
unsigned int num_fields;//number of fiels in result
dbif();
// connect to the database using these parms.
void connect(char * host,
char * user,
char * pass,
char * name,
unsigned int port,
char * socket,
unsigned int flags);
// disconnect from the database
void disconnect();
// query the database using supplied query
void query(char * query);
// return the current row of the results
MYSQL_ROW get_row();
// return the row number row from results
MYSQL_ROW get_row(unsigned int row);
void print_results();
// insert host information into the
// dynamic honeypot database
void dyhpinsert(datetime time,char * ipaddr, char*os);
// insert port information into the
// dynamic honeypot database
void portinsert(char *ip,char * port);
// return true if ip is in the flock table.
bool isflock(char * ip);
};
#define DBIF
#endif
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#include"dbif.h"
/*
dbif.cpp
written by jeff hieb, July 2004
dbif class method implementations
*/
using namespace std;
dbif::dbif() {
mysql = NULL;
result = NULL;
num_rows = 0;
num_fields = 0;
}
void dbif::connect(char * host,
char * user,
char * pass,
char * name,
unsigned int port,
char * socket,
unsigned int flags)
{
if ((mysql = mysql_init(NULL)) == NULL) {
cout << "failed to inititialize\n";
exit(0);
}
if (mysql_real_connect(mysql,host,user,pass,name,port,socket,flags) == NULL ){
cout << "connection failed " << mysql_error(mysql);
exit (0);
}
}
void dbif::query(char * query)
{
// first free any previous results.
mysql_free_result(result);
// prefrom query, checking for errors
if(mysql_query(mysql, query) == 0) {
result = mysql_store_result(mysql);
if (result != NULL) {
// set number of rows
num_rows = mysql_num_rows(result);
// set number of fields
num_fields = mysql_field_count(mysql);
}
}
else {
// if an error occured, notify and exit
cout << query << "\n";
cout << "Query failed: " << mysql_error(mysql) << "\n";
exit (0);
}
}
MYSQL_ROW dbif::get_row() {
return mysql_fetch_row(result);
}
MYSQL_ROW dbif::get_row(unsigned int row) {
if (row < num_rows)
return mysql_fetch_row(result);
else
return NULL;
}

112

void dbif::print_results() {
unsigned int f;
MYSQL_ROW row;
if (result != NULL) {
while ((row = mysql_fetch_row(result)) != NULL) {
f= 0;
while (f<mysql_num_fields(result)) {
if (f>0) cout << "\t";
cout << row[f];
f++;
}
cout << "\n";
}
}
else {
cout << "empty result set\n";
}
}
bool dbif::isflock(char * ip)
{
char buf[255];
sprintf(buf,"select * from flock where ipaddr = INET_ATON('%s')",ip);
query(buf);
if (num_rows > 0)
return true;
return false;
}
void dbif::dyhpinsert(datetime time,char* ipaddr,char* os)
{
char buf[255];
// see if there is already an entry for this host
sprintf(buf,"select count from host where ipaddr=INET_ATON('%s') and os='%s'",ipaddr,os);
query(buf);
// if no then insert a new entry, with count = 1
if (num_rows == 0) {
sprintf(buf,"insert into host
values(INET_ATON('%s'),'%s',1,'%s')",ipaddr,os,time.asMysqlString());
query(buf);
}
// if yes, update the count field.
else {
sprintf(buf,"update host set count=count+1,last='%s' where ipaddr =
INET_ATON('%s') and os = '%s'",time.asMysqlString(),ipaddr,os);
query(buf);
}
}
void dbif::portinsert(char* ip,char* port)
{
char buf[255];
sprintf(buf,"select * from ports where ipaddr=INET_ATON('%s') and port='%s'",ip,port);
query(buf);
if (num_rows == 0) {
sprintf(buf,"insert into ports values(INET_ATON('%s'),%s,NULL,NULL)",ip,port);
query(buf);
}
}
void dbif::disconnect()
{
mysql_close(mysql);
}
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/*
datetime.h
written by Jeff Hieb July, 2004.
This is class definition file for the class datetime
*/
#ifndef MYDATETIME
#include<ctime>
#include<cstdlib>
#include<string>
class datetime {
struct tm time; // system time
public:
// standard constructor, sets time to current time
datetime();
// constructor, sets time to mysqlstring
datetime(char* mysqlstring);
// set time of first operator equal to
// time of second operator
datetime operator = (datetime op2);
// returns true if both datetime objects
// have the same time
friend bool operator==(datetime op1,datetime op2);
// returns true if first datetime object
// is earlier than the second datetime object
friend bool operator<(datetime op1,datetime op2);
// returns time as a MySQL string
char* datetime::asMysqlString();
// subtracts x hours from time.
void datetime::minusHours(int x);
};
#define MYDATETIME
#endif
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#include"datetime.h"
#include<iostream>
datetime::datetime(){
time_t theTime;
std::time(&theTime);
time = (*localtime(&theTime));
}
datetime::datetime(char *mysqlstring) {
char temp[10];
int yr,mo,da,hr,mi,se;
mysqlstring[4]=' ';
mysqlstring[7]=' ';
mysqlstring[10]=' ';
mysqlstring[13]=' ';
mysqlstring[16]=' ';
sscanf(mysqlstring,"%d %d %d %d %d %d",&yr,&mo,&da,&hr,&mi,&se);
time.tm_year = yr-1900;
time.tm_mon = mo - 1;
time.tm_mday = da;
time.tm_hour = hr;
time.tm_min = mi;
time.tm_sec = se;
}
datetime datetime::operator=(datetime op2) {
time = op2.time;
return *this;
}
bool operator==(datetime op1,datetime op2) {
if ((op1.time.tm_year == op2.time.tm_year) &&
(op1.time.tm_mon == op2.time.tm_year) &&
(op1.time.tm_mday == op2.time.tm_mday) &&
(op1.time.tm_hour == op2.time.tm_hour) &&
(op1.time.tm_min == op2.time.tm_min) &&
(op1.time.tm_sec == op2.time.tm_sec))
return true;
return false;
}
bool operator<(datetime op1, datetime op2) {
double result;
op1.time.tm_isdst = op2.time.tm_isdst;
result = difftime(mktime(&(op2.time)),mktime(&(op1.time)));
if (result > 0)
return true;
return false;
}
char * datetime::asMysqlString() {
char buf[80];
char * ret;
sprintf(buf,"%d-%d-%d %d:%d:%d",time.tm_year + 1900,\
time.tm_mon + 1,time.tm_mday,time.tm_hour, \
time.tm_min, time.tm_sec);
ret = (char *)malloc(strlen(buf) + 1);
strcpy(ret,buf);
return ret;
}
void datetime::minusHours(int x){
if (time.tm_hour > x)
time.tm_hour -= x;
else {
x -= time.tm_hour;
time.tm_hour = 23;
if (time.tm_mday > 1) {
time.tm_mday --;
}
else {
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switch (time.tm_mon) {
case 0:
time.tm_year --;
time.tm_mon = 11;
time.tm_mday = 31;
break;
case 2:
time.tm_mon = 1;
time.tm_mday = 28;
break;
case 1:
case 3:
case 5:
case 7:
case 8:
case 10:
time.tm_mon--;
time.tm_mday = 31;
break;
default:
time.tm_mon--;
time.tm_mday = 30;
}
}
minusHours(x);
}
}
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#include<iostream>
#include<fstream>
#include<cstdlib>
#include"datetime.h"
#include"dbif.h"
/*
passive.cpp
written by jeff hieb, july 2004
extract host IP address, date and operating system
from p0f output and place it in the dynamic honeypot data base.
*/
using namespace std;
datetime gettime(char * buffer)
{
char month[4];
char monthnum[3];
char date[20];
int i;
month[0] = buffer[5];month[1] = buffer[6];month[2]=buffer[7];month[3]='\0';
if (strcasecmp(month,"Jan") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '1';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Feb") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '2';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Mar") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '3';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Apr") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '4';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"May") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '5';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Jun") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '6';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Jul") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '7';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Aug") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '8';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Sep") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '0'; monthnum[1] = '9';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Oct") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '1'; monthnum[1] = '0';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Nov") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '1'; monthnum[1] = '1';}
if (strcasecmp(month,"Dec") == 0){ monthnum[0] = '1'; monthnum[1] = '2';}
for (i=0;i<4;i++)
date[i]=buffer[21+i];
date[4] = ' ';
date[5] = monthnum[0];
date[6] = monthnum[1];
date[7] = ' ';
date[8]= buffer[9];
date[9]=buffer[10];
date[10] = ' ';
for (i=11;i<19;i++)
date[i] = buffer[i+1];
date[19] = '\0';
return datetime((char*)date);
}
void getip(char* buffer, char *addr)
{
int i;
for (i=0;i<20;i++)
addr[i] = '\0';
for (i = 27;i<45;i++){
if(buffer[i] == ':') break;
addr[i -27] = buffer[i];
}
addr[i] = '\0';
}
char * getos(char * buffer)
{
char temp[80];
char *temp2;
int i;
temp2 = index(buffer, '-') + 2;
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for (i = 0;i < 80;i++)
{
if (temp2[i] == '(' || temp2[i] == ',' || temp2[i] == '[' || i > strlen(temp2)) {
temp[i] = '\0';break;
}
temp[i] = temp2[i];
}
temp2 = (char*)malloc(strlen(temp) + 1);
strcpy(temp2,temp);
return temp2;
}
void getipport(char* buffer,char*ip,char*port)
{
int i,j;
for (i=0;i<20;i++)
ip[i] = '\0';
i = 0;
for(j=0;j<4;j++)
{
while(isdigit(buffer[i])) ip[i]=buffer[i++];
ip[i++]='.';
}
ip[--i]='\0';
j=++i;
while(isdigit(buffer[i])) port[i-j]=buffer[i++];
port[i-j] = '\0';
}

int

main() {

char buf[255];
datetime time;
char ip[20];
char *os;
int c;
char *ipport;
char port[16];
dbif hpdb;

hpdb.connect("localhost","p0f","xyz","dyhp_db",3306,NULL,0);
cin.getline(buf,255);
while (cin) {
if (buf[0] == '<'){
time = gettime(buf);
getip(buf, ip);
os = getos(buf);
if (hpdb.isflock(ip))
{
hpdb.dyhpinsert(time,ip,os);
}
free(os);
}
cin.getline(buf,255);
}
return 0;
}
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#include<iostream>
#include<fstream>
#include<cstdlib>
#include"datetime.h"
#include"dbif.h"
/*
port.cpp
written by jeff hieb, july 2004
extract port number and IP address from tcpdump data and
insert into dynamic honeypot database.
*/
using namespace std;
void getipport(char* buffer,char*ip,char*port)
{
int i,j;
for (i=0;i<20;i++)
ip[i] = '\0';
i = 0;
for(j=0;j<4;j++)
{
while(isdigit(buffer[i])) ip[i]=buffer[i++];
ip[i++]='.';
}
ip[--i]='\0';
j=++i;
while(isdigit(buffer[i])) port[i-j]=buffer[i++];
port[i-j] = '\0';
}

int

main() {

char buf[255];
datetime time;
char ip[20];
char *os;
int c;
char *ipport;
char port[16];
dbif hpdb;

hpdb.connect("localhost","p0f","xyz","dyhp_db",3306,NULL,0);
cin.getline(buf,255);
while ( cin) {
ipport = index(buf,'P') +2;
getipport(ipport,ip,port);
if (hpdb.isflock(ip))
{
hpdb.portinsert(ip,port);
}
cin.getline(buf,255);
}
return 0;
}
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#include<iostream>
#include<fstream>
#include<cstdlib>
#include"datetime.h"
#include"dbif.h"
/*
flock.cpp
writen by jeff hieb, july 2004
recieve ip addresses from standard input and place them
in the flock table.
*/
using namespace std;
int

main() {

char buf[255];
datetime time;
char ip[20];
char *os;
int c;
char *ipport;
char port[16];
dbif hpdb;

hpdb.connect("localhost","p0f","xyz","dyhp_db",3306,NULL,0);
cin >> ip;
while (cin) {
if (strcmp(ip,"0.0.0.0") != 0)
{
sprintf(buf,"replace into flock values (INET_ATON('%s'),null)",ip);
hpdb.query(buf);
}
cin >> ip;
}
return 0;
}
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/*
main.cpp
written by Jeff Hieb, July 2004
created the dynamic honeypot object,
calles update, and lauched Honeyd, Snort, and Arpd
waits and loops
*/
#include<netinet/in.h>
#include<arpa/inet.h>
#include<cstdlib>
#include"dynhp.h"
using namespace std;
int get_honeydpid()
// get the processes id of honeyd
{
ifstream fp;
fp.open("/var/run/honeyd.pid");
int pid;
fp >> pid;
fp.close();
return pid;
}
int get_snortpid()
// get the process id of Snort
{
ifstream fp;
fp.open("/var/run/snort_eth0.pid");
int pid;
fp >> pid;
fp.close();
return pid;
}
int get_arpdpid()
// get the process id of arpd
{
ifstream fp;
fp.open("/var/run/arpd.pid");
int pid;
fp >> pid;
fp.close();
return pid;
}
void config_snort(dynhp * thehp)
// write the addtional snort configuration file
// "dynhp.config" that contains the variable
// $HOME_NET, a list of the honeypot IP addresses
{
uint32_t * hpips;
int * hpports;
int numips,numports;
ofstream sensor;
struct in_addr ip;
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hpips = thehp->get_hp_ip(numips);
hpports = thehp->get_hp_ports(numports);
sensor.open("dynhp.config");
sensor << "VAR HOME_NET [";
ip.s_addr = ntohl(hpips[0]);
sensor << inet_ntoa(ip);
for(int i =1;i<numips;i++)
{
ip.s_addr = ntohl(hpips[i]);
sensor << "," << inet_ntoa(ip);
}
sensor << "]\n";
sensor << "VAR HP_PORTS ";
for(int i = 0;i<numports;i++)
{
sensor << hpports[i] << " ";
}
sensor << "\n";
sensor.close();
delete [] hpips;
delete [] hpports;
}
int main (int argc, char *argv)
{
int honeydpid,snortpid,arpdpid;
char command1[40], command2[40], command3[40];
char test[40];
// create the dynamic honeypot object,
// IP address is hard coded, could be passed through command line
dynhp mydynhp("192.168.2.16");
while(true){
// update the honeypot definitions
mydynhp.update();
// configure snort
config_snort(&mydynhp);
// write the honeyd config file
mydynhp.write_config();
// start aprd, snort, and honeyd
system("arpd");
system("snort -D -l ./hplogs -c snorthp.conf");
system("honeyd -l /home/sysjeff/dynhp/hplogs/honeyd.log -p nmap-os-fingerprints -f
honeyd.conf");
// wait one day
system("sleep 24h");
// get process ids
arpdpid = get_arpdpid();
honeydpid = get_honeydpid();
snortpid = get_snortpid();
sprintf(command1,"kill
sprintf(command2,"kill
sprintf(command3,"kill

%d",honeydpid);
%d",snortpid);
%d",arpdpid);

// clean up
mydynhp.rm_hp_hosts();
// kill services
system(command1);
system(command2);
system(command3);
} // end of while
}
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/*
dynhp.h
written by jeff hieb, july 2004
this is the definition file for the class dynhp
dynhp is the main dynhp engine.
*/
#include<iostream>
#include<fstream>
#include<cstdlib>
#include"dbif.h"
#include<netinet/in.h>
#include<arpa/inet.h>
#include<iostream>
#include<fstream>
using namespace std;
class dynhp {
unsigned long addr_sp_size;// based on hosts IP address
int num_hosts;
int density ;// % of average distance to be used for threshold
int threshold;// man IP address distance between to hosts
// in the same group
long interval;// number of seconds prior to current time
// beyond which hosts information
// should not be considered
int hostbits; // number of bits used to distinguish hosts.
char *ip;
// IP address of the local interface
char net[20]; // network address
char buf[255];// buffer used by various methods.
MYSQL_ROW row;
dbif database;// dynamic honeypot database interface
ofstream config;// file stream for writting configuraiton files
void calc_net();// calculate the network address
void selectip(int hpid);
void selectos(int hpid);
void selectport(int hpid);
public:
dynhp();
~dynhp();
dynhp(char * theNet);
void get_addr_sp_size();
void get_num_hosts();
void calc_threshold();
int is_in_honeypot(uint32_t ip);
// return the honeypot id for the address ip
// or -1 if not in a honeypot group
void update();
// update configuration information
void rm_hp_hosts();
// delete any honeypot data from the
// hosts tables
void configurehpip();
void configurehpos();
void configurehpport();
void write_config();
void write_config(int hpid);
int member(uint32_t ip);
// return the honeypot group to which ip
// belongs, or -1 if none is found
int recurmem(uint32_t ip,char*os,int t,int hpid);
// recursive membership, restrict ip
// distance till 1 or 0 groups
void add_host(uint32_t ip, int hpid);
void mk_new_hp(uint32_t ip);
uint32_t *get_hp_ip(int & num);
int *get_hp_ports(int & num);
};
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/*
dynhp.cpp
written by jeff hieb, July 2004
these are the method implementations
for the class dynhp, the dynamic honeypot engine
*/
#include"dynhp.h"
using namespace std;
dynhp::dynhp()
// default constructor, use IP = 0.0.0.0, and net = 0.0.0.0
{
ip = new char[strlen("0.0.0.0") +1];
strcpy(net,"0.0.0.0");
density = 25; // default setting, translates to 75%
database.connect("localhost","p0f","xyz","dyhp_db",3306,NULL,0);
interval = 10 * 1000000;//period of time, in seconds that
//hosts are considered active.
}
dynhp::dynhp(char * theIP)
// constructor, theIP is the IP address from the interface that
// honeyd will listen on
{
ip = new char[strlen(theIP) +1];
strcpy(ip,theIP);
density = 25;
database.connect("localhost","p0f","xyz","dyhp_db",3306,NULL,0);
interval = 10 * 1000000;
}
dynhp::~dynhp()
{
rm_hp_hosts();
database.query("delete from honeyhosts");
database.query("delete from honeypots");
database.query("delete from honeyports");
}
void dynhp::get_addr_sp_size()
// determine the address space size
{
int i,j;
uint32_t a,b,x,y,mask;
bool flag = false;
MYSQL_ROW cursor;
mask = 0x80000000;
// get all the IP addresses of the hosts
sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from host");
database.query(buf);
if (database.num_rows < 2)
exit (0);
cursor = database.get_row();
if (cursor == NULL) exit(0);
a = atoll(cursor[0]);
// loop until a bit is found that is the same for all IP addresses
// j is that bit, or until all 32 bits have been examined.
for (j = 0; j< 32; j++)
{
x = a<<j & mask;
for (i = 1; i<database.num_rows;i++)
{
cursor = database.get_row(i);
b=atoll(cursor[0]);
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if (x != (b<<j & mask))
{
flag = true;
break;
}
}
if (flag) break;
}
hostbits = j; // j is the number of bits used to distingish the hosts
// addr_sp_size is the total number of hosts
// possible using only j bits
addr_sp_size = (unsigned long) pow((double)2,(31-j)+1);
}
void dynhp::get_num_hosts()
{
sprintf(buf,"select count(distinct ipaddr) from host where last > now() - %d",interval);
database.query(buf);
row = database.get_row();
if (row == NULL)
exit(0);
num_hosts = atoi(row[0]);
}

void dynhp::calc_threshold()
// determine the threshold value,
// from the address space size an the number of hosts.
{
int avg_dist;
double local_d;
double mydensity;
avg_dist = addr_sp_size / num_hosts;
density = density % 100;
mydensity = (double)(100- density);
local_d = mydensity / 100;
threshold = (int)(local_d * avg_dist);
}
void dynhp::calc_net()
{
struct in_addr ipaddr;
uint32_t temp;
char * out;
ipaddr.s_addr = inet_addr(ip);
ipaddr.s_addr = ntohl(ipaddr.s_addr);
temp = (uint32_t) (pow((double)2,(32 -hostbits)) - 1);
ipaddr.s_addr = ipaddr.s_addr & (~temp);
ipaddr.s_addr = ntohl(ipaddr.s_addr);
sprintf(net,"%s/%d",inet_ntoa(ipaddr),hostbits);
}
int dynhp::is_in_honeypot(uint32_t ip)
{
int a;
sprintf(buf,"select hpid from honeyhosts where ipaddr = %u",ip);
database.query(buf);
if (database.num_rows > 0)
{
row = database.get_row();
a = atoi(row[0]);
}
else a = -1;
return a;
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}
void dynhp::rm_hp_hosts()
// remove any honeypots that have fingerprinted and
// inserted into the host table
{
int c,i;
uint32_t *iplist;
sprintf(buf,"select distinct ipaddr from honeypots");
database.query(buf);
c=database.num_rows;
if (c==0) return;
iplist = new uint32_t[c];
for (i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]);
}
for (i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
sprintf(buf,"delete from flock where ipaddr = %u",iplist[i]);
database.query(buf);
sprintf(buf,"delete from host where ipaddr = %u",iplist[i]);
database.query(buf);
}
delete [] iplist;
}
void dynhp::update()
// update the honeypot configurations
{
int i,j;
int c;
int hpid,hpid_temp;
uint32_t ip,*iplist;
// clear any previous work
rm_hp_hosts();
database.query("delete from honeyhosts");
database.query("delete from honeypots");
database.query("delete from honeyports");
// set up the parameters
get_addr_sp_size();
get_num_hosts();
calc_threshold();
calc_net();
// get all the relevant hosts from the host table
// and put them in an array called iplist
sprintf(buf,"select distinct ipaddr from host where last > now() - %d order by ipaddr",
interval);
database.query(buf);
c = database.num_rows;
iplist = new uint32_t[c];
for (i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]);
}
// partition the hosts into groups
for (i=0;i<c;i++)
{
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ip = iplist[i];
hpid = member(ip);
if (hpid == -1)
{
mk_new_hp(ip);
}
else
{
add_host(ip,hpid);
}
}
delete [] iplist;
// configure the honeypots
configurehpip();
configurehpos();
configurehpport();
}
int dynhp::member(uint32_t ip)
// determine the group to which the host ip belongs
// and retrun it, if no group is identified, return -1
{
char ostype[80];
int hpid;
int x,y,i;
// get the most common operating system finger print
// for this IP address
sprintf(buf,"select os from host where ipaddr = %u order by count desc",ip);
database.query(buf);
if (database.num_rows == 0) return -1;
row = database.get_row();
i=0;
// parse out the intial word, to be the operating system type
while(isalnum(row[0][i]) && i < 40)
{
ostype[i]=row[0][i];
i++;
}
ostype[i]='%';
ostype[i+1]='\0';
// find all honeypot groups (hpid) with hosts whose IP address
// is within threshold, and
// whose os is stringwise similar to the operating system type
sprintf(buf,"select t1.hpid from honeypots as t1,honeyhosts as t2,host as t3 where
t1.hpid = t2.hpid and t2.ipaddr = t3.ipaddr and t2.ipaddr between %u and %u and t3.os
like '%s'",ip-threshold,ip+threshold,ostype);
database.query(buf);
//
if
//
if

if none return -1
(database.num_rows==0) return -1;
if only one honeypot group, return this group id
(database.num_rows==1)
{
row = database.get_row();
return atoi(row[0]);
}
// if there is more than one group, reduce the threshold by one half
// and continue recursively till one group can be identified.
if (database.num_rows > 1)
{
row = database.get_row();
hpid = atoi(row[0]);
return recurmem(ip,ostype,(int)threshold/2,hpid);
}
}
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int dynhp::recurmem(uint32_t ip, char * os, int t, int hpid)
// recursive memebership function
{
int l_hpid;
sprintf(buf,"select t1.hpid from honeypots as t1,honeyhosts as t2,host as t3 where
t1.hpid = t2.hpid and t2.ipaddr = t3.ipaddr and t2.ipaddr between %u and %u and t2.ipaddr
!= %u and t3.os like '%s'",ip,ip-t,ip+t,os);
database.query(buf);
if (database.num_rows == 1)
{
row = database.get_row();
return atoi(row[0]);
}
else if (database.num_rows == 0)
{
return hpid;
}
else
{
return recurmem(ip,os,(int)t/2,hpid);
}
}
void dynhp::add_host(uint32_t ip, int hpid)
// associates ip to hpid.
{
sprintf(buf,"insert into honeyhosts values(%d,%u)",hpid,ip);
database.query(buf);
}
void dynhp::mk_new_hp(uint32_t ip)
// create a new honeypot group
{
int hpid;
database.query("select hpid from honeypots order by hpid");
if (database.num_rows == 0)
hpid = 10;
else
{
row = database.get_row(database.num_rows - 1);
hpid = atoi(row[0]) + 10;
}
sprintf(buf,"insert into honeypots values (%d,NULL,NULL)",hpid);
database.query(buf);
add_host(ip,hpid);
}
uint32_t * dynhp::get_hp_ip(int & num)
// return an array of IP addresses that contains
// all the honeypot IP addresses
{
uint32_t * iplist;
int c;
database.query("select ipaddr from honeypots where ipaddr is not NULL");
c = database.num_rows;
iplist = new uint32_t[c];
for (int i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]);
}
num = c;
return iplist;
}
int * dynhp::get_hp_ports(int & num)
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// return an array that contains all the
// open ports on all the honeypots
{
int c,*portlist;
database.query("select distinct port from honeyports");
c = database.num_rows;
portlist = new int[c];
for (int i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
portlist[i] = atoi(row[0]);
}
num = c;
return portlist;
}

void dynhp::configurehpip()
// establish the IP address for each honeypot
{
int *hpid,c;
database.query("select hpid from honeypots where ipaddr is NULL");
c = database.num_rows;
hpid = new int[c];
for(int i =0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]);
}
for(int i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
selectip(hpid[i]);
}
delete [] hpid;
}
void dynhp::selectip(int hpid)
// determine the ip address for the honeypot indicated by hpid
{
int i,j;
uint32_t *iplist,a,b,x,y,newip;
bool flag = false;
int lowbit;
int offset;
unsigned int val;
// get all the host IP addresses associated with this honeypot
sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from honeyhosts where hpid = %d",hpid);
database.query(buf);
int c = database.num_rows;
if (c == 0) return;
// put them in an array
iplist = new uint32_t[c];
for (i=0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
iplist[i] = atoll(row[0]);
}
// find the first (low order) bit that is not the
// same for each host. j is the bit number
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if (c == 1) flag = true;
for (j = 0; j<=hostbits; j++)
{
x = iplist[0]>>j & 01;
for (i = 1; i<c;i++)
{
b=iplist[i];
if (x != (b<<j & 01))
{
flag = true;
break;
}
}
if (flag) break;
}
// set the low bit to be j
lowbit = j;
// generate a random number between one and c, the number of hosts
offset = (int)(c *(rand()/(RAND_MAX + 1.0)));
// continue to flip successively higher bits of each host
// till and IP address is found that is not in use,
for (j=lowbit;j<hostbits;j++)
{
val = 0;
for (int k=lowbit;k<j;k++)
{
val += (unsigned int)pow((double)2,k);
for (i=0;i<c;i++)
{
// get new IP address
newip = (~(~iplist[(i+offset) % c] ^ val));
// see if it is in use (from flock table)
sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from flock where ipaddr = %u",newip);
database.query(buf);
// if not in use, store it in the database
// and exit
if (database.num_rows == 0){
sprintf(buf,"update honeypots set ipaddr = %u where hpid =
%d",newip,hpid);
database.query(buf);
return;
}
}
}
}
delete [] iplist;
}

void dynhp::configurehpos()
// determine the operating system finger print for each honeypot
{
int *hpid,c;
database.query("select hpid from honeypots where os is NULL");
c = database.num_rows;
hpid = new int[c];
for(int i =0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]);
}
for(int i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
selectos(hpid[i]);
}

130

delete [] hpid;
}
void dynhp::selectos(int hpid)
// determine the operating system finger print for the honeypot
// indicated by hpid
{
char * os_type,*os_temp;
char os_finger[255];
int os_len;
// get the operating systems for each host that is
// a memeber of the honeypot group hpid
sprintf(buf,"select h.os from host h,honeyhosts t, honeypots p where t.ipaddr = h.ipaddr
and t.hpid = p.hpid and p.hpid = '%d' and h.os != 'UNKNOWN' order by h.count desc",hpid);
database.query(buf);
//
//
//
if

parse out the operating system type
begin string comparision to possible dynamic honeypot
operating system fingerprints, stored in table osfinger
(database.num_rows > 0)
{
row = database.get_row();
os_len = strlen(row[0]) + 1;
os_type = new char[os_len];
os_temp = new char[os_len];
for (int i=0;i<os_len;i++) os_temp[i] = '\0';
strcpy(os_type,row[0]);
strncpy(os_temp,row[0],3);
sprintf(buf,"select name from osfinger where name like '%s%%'",os_temp);
database.query(buf);
// if more than one fingerprint is identified
// then use more of the operating system string to
// narrow the possibilities
if (database.num_rows >0)
{
row = database.get_row();
strcpy(os_finger,row[0]);
for (int j = 3; j<os_len;j++)
{
os_temp[j] = os_type[j];
sprintf(buf,"select name from osfinger where name like
'%s%%'",os_temp);
database.query(buf);
if (database.num_rows==0)
break;
row = database.get_row();
strcpy(os_finger,row[0]);
}
sprintf(buf,"update honeypots set os = '%s' where hpid =
'%d'",os_finger,hpid);
database.query(buf);
}
delete [] os_type;
delete [] os_temp;
}
}
void dynhp::configurehpport()
// determine the open ports for each honeypot group
{
int *hpid,c;
sprintf(buf,"delete from honeyports");
database.query(buf);
database.query("select hpid from honeypots");
c = database.num_rows;
hpid = new int[c];
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for(int i =0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]);
}
for(int i = 0;i<c;i++)
{
selectport(hpid[i]);
}
delete [] hpid;
}
void dynhp::selectport(int hpid)
// determine the open ports for the honeypot group hpid.
{
int *p;
uint32_t *ip;
sprintf(buf,"select distinct p.port, p.ipaddr from ports p,honeypots h, honeyhosts k
where p.ipaddr = k.ipaddr and k.hpid = h.hpid and h.hpid = %d",hpid);
database.query(buf);
int c = database.num_rows;
p = new int[c];
ip = new uint32_t[c];
for (int j = 0;j<c;j++)
{
row = database.get_row();
p[j] = atoi(row[0]);
ip[j] = atoll(row[1]);
}
for (int i = 0;i<c; i++)
{
sprintf(buf,"replace into honeyports values
(%d,%d,INET_NTOA(%u),NULL)",hpid,p[i],ip[i]);
database.query(buf);
}
}
void dynhp::write_config()
// white the honeyd configuration file "honeyd.conf"
// using the dynamic honeypot database.
{
int c;
int *hpid;
config.open("honeyd.conf");
config << "create default\n";
config << "set default personality \"Windows NT4 / Win95 / Win98\"\n";
config << "set default default tcp action block\n";
config << "set default default udp action block\n";
config << "set default default icmp action block\n\n";
database.query("select hpid from honeypots where ipaddr is not NULL and os is not NULL");
c = database.num_rows;
hpid = new int[c];
for(int i =0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
hpid[i] = atoi(row[0]);
}
for(int j=0;j<c;j++)
{
write_config(hpid[j]);

132

}
config.close();
}
void dynhp::write_config(int hpid)
{
int c,i;
char * per,*ip;
int * ports;
char **proxys;
sprintf(buf,"select ipaddr from honeyhosts where hpid = %d",hpid);
database.query(buf);
if (database.num_rows == 0) return;
sprintf(buf,"select os,INET_NTOA(ipaddr) from honeypots where hpid = %d ",hpid);
database.query(buf);
c = database.num_rows;
if (c == 0) return;
row = database.get_row();
per = new char[strlen(row[0]) + 1];
ip = new char[strlen(row[1]) +1];
strcpy(per, row[0]);
strcpy(ip,row[1]);
sprintf(buf,"select port,proxy from honeypots p,honeyports k where p.hpid = %d and p.hpid
= k.hpid",hpid);
database.query(buf);
c=database.num_rows;
ports = new int[c];
proxys = new char*[c];
for(i=0;i<c;i++)
{
row = database.get_row();
ports[i] = atoi(row[0]);
proxys[i] = new char[strlen(row[1]) + 1];
strcpy(proxys[i],row[1]);
}
config << "create honeypot" << hpid << "intern\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " personality \"" << per << "\"\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " default tcp action block\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " default udp action block\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "intern" << " default icmp action open\n";
for (i=0;i<c; i++)
{
row = database.get_row(i);
config << "add honeypot" << hpid << "intern tcp port " << ports[i];
config << " proxy " << proxys[i] << ":" << ports[i] << "\n";
}
config << "create honeypot" << hpid << "extern\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " personality \"" << per << "\"\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " default tcp action block\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " default udp action block\n";
config << "set honeypot" << hpid << "extern" << " default icmp action open\n";
for (i=0;i<c; i++)
{
row = database.get_row(i);
config << "add honeypot" << hpid << "extern tcp port " << ports[i];
sprintf(buf,"select script from scripts where port = %d",ports[i]);
database.query(buf);
if (database.num_rows > 0) {
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row = database.get_row();
config << " \"" << row[0] << "\"\n";
}
else {
config << " open\n";
}
}
config
config
config
config
config
config

<<
<<
<<
<<
<<
<<

"dynamic honeypot" << hpid << "\n";
"add honeypot" << hpid << " use honeypot" << hpid;
"intern if source ip = " << net << "\n";
"add honeypot" << hpid << " otherwise use honeypot" << hpid;
"extern\n";
"bind " << ip << " honeypot" << hpid << "\n";
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